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POSTHUMOUS PRIVACY, DECEDENT INTENT, AND
POST-MORTEM ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS
Alberto B. Lopez'
INTRODUCTION
In a book describing the history of the Internet published just before the
turn of the century, an author loftily mused that he age of digitization
sparked "social changes so profound their only parallel is probably the dis-
covery of fire."' Comparing the digital age to the discovery of fire may in-
volve a tiny bit of hyperbole, but the digital age has had an unquestionable
impact on the way we live. The simple act of clicking a mouse or swiping a
touchscreen has transformed us into individuals that look down at digital de-
vices without regard to much else. Addressing the downward-looking trend,
The New York Times published a blog post entitled "Distracted Walkers Pose
Threat to Self and Others" that detailed the dangers of texting while walking.2
Supporting the blog post's title, a recent scientific study found that texting
while walking caused a 61% increase in "lateral deviation."' Statistically sig-
nificant scientific results are valuable, but one need only walk down a street
or in a shopping mall to conclude that texting while walking impairs what
the study described as "executive function."'
Beyond its physiological effect, the digital revolution has triggered a
cascade of legal consequences, both in and out of the courtroom. Digital me-
dia has had its most obvious legal impact on intellectual property law in cases
like Metro Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.;' however, the le-
gal footprint created by the digital revolution is not confined to that domain.'
Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. The author thanks all of the individuals
who patiently discussed the topic of this paper with him. Any errors are, of course, attributable to the
author.
1 DAVID HUDSON, REWIRED: A BRIEF AND OPINIONATED NET HISTORY 7 (Carla Hall et al. eds.,
1997) (quoting publisher Louis Rossetto in Wired magazine's debut issue).
2 Jane E. Brody, Distracted Walkers Pose Threat to Self and Others, N.Y. TIMES: WELL (Dec. 7,
2015), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/its-not-just-drivers-being-driven-to-distraction/?r-0.
3 Eric M. Lamberg & Lisa M. Muratori, Cell Phones Change the Way We Walk, 35 GAIT &
POSTURE 688, 689 (2012).
4 Id. at 688.
5 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
6 For information regarding the impact of file sharing on the Copyright Act, see, e.g., The Honor-
able Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, Brace Memorial Lecture at the New
York University School of Law: Copyright Enters the Public Domain (Apr. 29, 2004), in 51 J. Copyright
Soc'y U.S.A. 701 (2004); RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, Elec. Frontier Found. (Sept. 30, 2008),
https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later#footnote9l_ine688d (describing the difficulties
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For example, ready access to and abuse of digital information prompted
nearly all fifty states to enact criminal punishments for cyber-stalking and
cyber-harassment.' But regardless of the specific area of law, the Newtonian
relationship between technological advancement and the law is not, of
course, new.' Orville and Wilbur Wright initiated numerous lawsuits seeking
to protect the patent to their "flying machine" and the invention of the auto-
mobile generated traffic codes that transformed roads from a place occupied
by.pedestrians to a space reserved for cars.' In short, innovation has long led
to litigation and legislation even if the innovation falls beneath fire in the
order of importance.
Amidst an increasingly digitized world, one area of law has been largely
resistant to change-the law of wills. The signature and witness requirements
mandated by modem statutes of wills trace their origins back to the Statute
of Wills of 1540, which was enacted during the reign of Henry VIII, as well
as the Statute of Frauds of 1677.10 Despite the centuries of inertia propelling
some of the statutory requirements for valid execution of a will, the digital
age has affected the interpretation of those requirements in isolated instances.
For example, an Ohio court decided that a will written on a Samsung Galaxy
tablet satisfied Ohio's signature and writing requirements, and a Tennessee
court concluded that a "computer generated signature" met the state's signa-
ture requirement for due execution." Legislatively, Nevada enacted a statute
associated with copyright enforcement); Evan Perez, New Conservative Legal Challenge to NSA Phone
Data Program, CNN (June 5, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/05/politics/nsa-phone-metadata-col-
lection-court-challenge/index.html (outlining arguments that the NSA's metadata collection program
challenges the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment).
7 See Steven D. Hazelwood & Sarah Koon-Magnin, Cyber Stalking and Cyber Harassment Legis-
lation in the United States: A Qualitative Analysis, 7 INTL. J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 155, 159-61 (2013)
(providing an extensive list of state statutes concerning cyberstalking and cyberharrassment and distin-
guishing between cyberstalking and cyberharrassment).
8 Isaac Newton was involved in an intellectual property dispute with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
over the invention of calculus. See Rose Eveleth, Five Epic Patent Wars that Don't Involve Apple,
SMITHSONIAN (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/five-epic-patent-wars-that-
dont-involve-apple-1 6729368/?no-ist.
9 See, e.g., Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 211 F. 654 (2d Cir. 1914); Wright Co. v. Herring-
Curtiss Co., 180 F. 110 (2d Cir. 1910); see also PETER D. NORTON, FIGHTING TRAFFIC: THE DAWN OF
THE MOTOR AGE IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2008) (tracing the transformation of American street usage).
10 C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination
of the New Uniform Probate Code "Harmless Error" Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, Part
One: The Wills Act Formula, The Rite of Testation, and the Question of Intent: A Problem in Search of a
Solution, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 177 (1991) ("In comparison to other statutory law, the wills acts have
proved to be extraordinarily resistant to change.").
11 Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830, 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); see also, Brad Dicken, Judge Rules
That a Will Written and Signed on Tablet Is Legal, THE CHRONICLE-TELEGRAM (June 25, 2013),
http://chronicle.northcoastnow.com/2013/06/25/judge-rules-will-written-signed-on-tablet-is-legal/ (ex-
plaining that a will written and signed on a tablet "will me[e]t the legal definition of a will in Ohio").
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that validates "electronic wills" provided such wills contain the date, the tes-
tator's signature, and "one authentication characteristic of the testator."l2
While a few intersections between the law of wills and digital information
can be unearthed, the law of wills and the digital age remain, for the most
part, on parallel paths. Indeed, Nevada is the only state to recognize elec-
tronic wills by statute, and it did so fifteen years ago in 2001.13
Recently, however, the digital age has clashed with the law of wills in
courtrooms and legislatures around the country.14 As the world has become
increasingly digitized, executors have encountered difficulty when seeking
access to a decedent's digital assets that are stored in password-protected
online accounts." For example, the author of the international best seller
Pomegranate Soup, Marsha Mehran, died unexpectedly and without expla-
nation in Ireland.'" Mehran's father, Abbas Mehran, sought to determine if
his daughter left any literary works on her Google Chromebook after her
tragic death. Hoping to unlock the Chromebook, Mr. Mehran sent four emails
to Google seeking access to his daughter's account, but Google did not reply
to any of the emails." Eventually, Mr. Mehran hired an attorney and filed a
petition in court asking for access to documents on his daughter's Google
Drive account." Following "several weeks of negotiation," Mr. Mehran ob-
tained a CD from Google that included over 200 documents written by his
12 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2014). For an examination of issues associated with digital wills,
see Gerry W. Beyer & Claire G. Hargrove, Digital Wills: Has the Time Come for Wills to Join the Digital
Revolution?, 33 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 865 (2007).
13 S. 33, 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Nev. 2001) (approving an act "providing for the use of electronic
wills and electronic trusts").
14 See, e.g., Naomi Cahn et al., Digital Assets and Fiduciaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW (John A. Rothchild ed.) (forthcoming 2016), http://ssm.com/abstract
=2603398; Rebecca G. Cummings, The Case Against Access to Decedents' Email: Password Protection
as an Exercise of the Right to Destroy, 15 MINN. J. L. SCi. & TECH. 897 (2014); James D. Lamm et al.,
The Digital Death Conundrum: How Federal and State Laws Prevent Fiduciaries from Managing Digital
Property, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385 (2014); Jeehyeon Lee, Note, Death and Live Feeds: Privacy Protec-
tion in Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 654 (2015).
15 See Lee, supra note 14, at 664 (explaining that online service provider terms of service may be
violated even where a decedent volunteered her login information to the fiduciary); Lamm et al., supra
note 14, at 399-400 ("When a fiduciary uses an account holder's username and password . .. that fiduciary
may risk criminal liability under federal and state criminal statutes."); see generally Cahn et al., supra
note 14 (explaining that computer access does not necessarily mean access to the data where passwords
and the data are encrypted).
16 Matt O'Brien, Who Owns Your Digital Afterlife?, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Aug. 29, 2015),
http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/business/20150829/who-owns-your-digital-afterlife ("An inquest [fol-
lowing Mehran's passing] . . . ruled out foul play but was otherwise inclusive, declaring: 'The medical
cause of death is underlying diseases which are unknown."').
17 id.
18 Id. Mehran paid an attorney $1,000 to look into the matter, but soon looked for another attorney
after learning that the attorney sought $10,000 for the representation. Id.
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daughter.19 The process began with the untimely passing of Mr. Mehran's
daughter and ended with the delivery of the CD to Mr. Mehran, but took more
than a year20 -a statistic that accounts for neither the personal hardship en-
dured nor the legal expense incurred during that period.
While Marsha Mehran's literary talent may have been unique, her usage
of password-protected online accounts for storage and communication is an-
ything but, and the challenges faced by individuals seeking access to those
accounts are predictable. Password-protected online accounts are ubiquitous
in the modem world, as individuals receive and pay bills, communicate via
text or email, bank, store photos and documents, and game without a tangible
analog in the physical world.2 1 According to a 2007 Microsoft study, partici-
pants had twenty-five online accounts that required a password for access.2 2
Following an individual's death, the decedent's personal representative may
attempt to discover the online accounts used by the decedent, unearth the
passwords to those accounts, and access those accounts in compliance with
terms of service agreements that may or may not address account manage-
ment at death.2 3 Subscribers of online services may have trouble remember-
ing their own logon information and passwords, let alone find such infor-
mation for an unknown number of online accounts held by a decedent.
If a personal representative does, in fact, discover a decedent's online
accounts and passwords, actual access to those accounts may violate state
privacy laws. Statutory law in each state bars unauthorized access to a com-
puter, accessing a computer without "effective consent," or some other sim-
ilar phrase grounded in the notion of privacy.2 4 Violations of such laws are
19 Id The CD was mailed to Mehran's attorney who then mailed it to Australia. Mr. Mehran neither
sought nor obtained his daughter's email messages. Id.
20 Id. Marsha Mehran died in April 2014 and her father received the CD in June 2015 or at some
point shortly thereafter. Id.
21 See generally Dinei Flor~ncio & Cormac Herley, A Large-Scale Study of Web Password Habits,
INTERNATIONAL WORLD WIDE WEB CONFERENCE COMMITTEE (2007), http://www2007.org/papers/
paper620.pdf (finding that the average user has about 25 password protected web accounts).
22 Id.
23 Jena L. Levin & John T. Brooks, Administration of Trusts and Estates in the Digital Age,
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Dec. 1, 2015), http://wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/adminis
tration-trusts-and-estates-digital-age ("Terms of Service (TOS) agreements for digital accounts ... are
typically silent regarding fiduciary access or simply prohibit third parties from accessing accounts alto-
gether. .. .").
24 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-302(c)(1)(i) (2016) ("A person may not ... without authoriza-
tion: access, attempt to access, cause to be accessed, or exceed the person's authorized access to all or
part of a computer network, computer control language, computer, computer software, computer system,
computer service, or computer database."); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02(a) (2015) ("A person com-
mits an offense if the person knowingly accesses a computer, computer network, or computer system
without the effective consent of the owner."). For a list of state privacy laws, see Computer Crime Statutes,
NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx (last updated May 12, 2016).
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deemed criminal offenses punishable by monetary fines and/or prison time.2 5
While the statutory protections may be primarily aimed at computer hacking,
a personal representative's act of accessing a decedent's online account in
the absence of consent seemingly runs afoul of the sweeping language of
state privacy laws. 2 6 As a result, the threat of criminal sanction, even if re-
mote, creates a disincentive for a representative to seek access to a decedent's
online accounts. To account for whatever degree of risk is posed by state
privacy laws, estate planners recommend preparing a list of online accounts
and passwords prior to death to provide evidence that a personal representa-
tive's access has been authorized by the decedent.27 Reflecting market de-
mand for post-mortem access mechanisms, online businesses that provide
post-mortem digital asset services are in no short supply.2 8 Nevertheless,
most individuals die without any estate planning; therefore, many, if not
most, personal representatives are unlikely to have much information about
the totality of a decedent's online presence.2 9
As an alternative, a personal representative may submit a request to an
online service provider for access to the decedent's account and a copy of
information stored in the account.3 0 Online service providers, however, are
reluctant to permit access to and the subsequent transfer of digital infor-
mation for fear of violating the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), which
is a portion of the larger Electronic Communications Privacy Act.3 1 Section
25 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-302(d)(1) (2016) (imposing a fine of up to $1,000
and/or a prison term not exceeding three years); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02(b) (2015) (designating
the offense as a "Class B misdemeanor").
26 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.5 (2016) ("A person is guilty of the crime of computer
invasion of privacy when he uses a computer or computer network and intentionally examines without
authority any employment, salary, credit, or any other financial or identifying information ... relating to
any other person.").
27 See, e.g., Mary Randolph, Access to Online Accounts. Helping Your Executor and Loved Ones,
NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/access-online-accounts-helping-executor-35013.html
(last visited Aug. 22, 2016).
28 See Evan Carroll, RIP Digital Legacy Startups, THE DIGITAL BEYOND (Mar. 21, 2014),
http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2014/03/rip-digital-legacy-startups/ (cataloging the success and failure
of various online businesses that handle digital- assets).
29 Press Release, Lawyers.com, Majority of American Adults Remain Without Wills, New Law-
yers.com Survey Finds (Apr. 3, 2007), http://press-room.lawyers.com/majority-of-american-adults-re-
main-without-wills.html. But see Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution
at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 336-39
(1978) (suggesting that the rate of testation may be greater than generally accepted).
30 See, e.g., Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 608-09 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (discussing a
request submitted by co-administrators of the decedent's estate for access to the decedent's Yahoo! email
account.)
31 Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-12 (2012)); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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2702(a)(1) of the SCA states "a person or entity providing an electronic com-
munication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person
or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that
service."3 2 The SCA contains exceptions that permit voluntary disclosure,3 3
but transferring the contents of an online account to a personal representative
during estate administration is not one such exception.3 4 While it may protect
an account holder's privacy interests during the account holder's life, the
SCA creates an additional legal obstacle to post-mortem data acquisition via
disclosure limitations it places on service providers."
The challenges encountered by a personal representative may be daunt-
ing, but accessing online accounts could prove critical due to the potential
value a decedent's digital assets. A 2012 Wall Street Journal article reported
that Americans valued their digital assets at over $55,000.36 Similarly, a
worldwide McAfee study released in 2013 concluded that the value of digital
assets stored on digital devices exceeded $35,000." The types of digital as-
sets held by individuals ranged from individual memories, valued at over
$17,000, to career information and entertainment files, valued at over $4,000
and $1,000, respectively." Though it may be difficult to believe that personal
memories have monetary values measured in the thousands of dollars, there
is no question that digital property can be surprisingly valuable. The 2008
edition of the Guinness Book of World Records identified an "asteroid" as
"The Most Expensive Virtual Object" at a purchase price of $100,000, which
eventually increased in value to $1 million and provided a monthly income
for its owner.3 9 Most people, of course, are not engaged in online transactions
to such an extreme. But even if the actual dollar value assigned to an individ-
ual's digital assets in McAfee's study were only 10% of the study's reported
value, the monetary value would still amount to $3,500.40 Such a figure is not
32 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2012).
13 Id. § 2702(b).
34 For an argument that personal representatives should be included among the exceptions, see Na-
talie M. Banta, Inherit the Cloud: The Role ofPrivate Contracts in Distributing or Deleting Digital Assets
at Death, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 840-42 (arguing that the exception for agents of a recipient of an
electronic communication should apply to estate representatives).
3 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012).
36 Kelly Greene, Passing Down Digital Assets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10000872396390443713704577601524091363102.
37 Robert Siciliano, How Do Your Digital Assets Compare?, MCAFFEE: CONSUMER BLOG (May
14, 2013), https://blogs.mcafee.com/consumer/digital-assets/.
38 Id.
39 Simon Hill, Most Expensive Items Ever Sold in an MMO, ALTERED GAMER (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://world-of-warcraft.alteredgamer.com/wow-other-items/29070-most-expensive-items-ever-sold-in-
an-mmo/.
40 See Siciliano, supra note 37.
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only likely to be significant for individual account holders, but is also repre-
sentative of the vast amount of wealth locked behind password-protected
online accounts when considered in the aggregate of online users.
Recognizing the legal obstacles that impede access to the potential value
stored in a decedent's online accounts, the Uniform Law Commission
("ULC") began to develop a proposal that would provide fiduciaries with
access to a decedent's digital assets in May 2011.41 One year later, the ULC
circulated a draft of the proposal and sought reaction from interested parties.42
In turn, a broad spectrum of groups and individuals commented on the pro-
posal, including the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and other
consumer advocacy groups.43 Following consideration of positive and nega-
tive comments, the ULC promulgated the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Dig-
ital Assets Act ("UFADAA") in July 2014.44 The ULC's model act granted
personal representatives with broad access to a decedent's digital assets in
the absence of an express prohibition by the decedent.45 As a measure of the
regulatory necessity, twenty-six states introduced UFADAA bills into their
state legislatures during their respective 2014-2015 sessions.46 Thus, the law
41 Letter from Gene H. Hennig, Minn. Comm'r, Unif. Law Comm'n, to Comm'r Harriet Lansing,
Chair, Comm. On Scope and Program, Unif. Law Comm'n (July 5, 2011), http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Committee.aspx?title=Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets [hereinafter Hennig letter]
(proposing to extend access to fiduciaries other than a personal representative of a decedent's estate, such
as a holder of a power of attorney or conservator). This paper is limited to an examination of access to
digital assets for a personal representative of an estate; therefore, issues associated with the other fiduci-
aries covered by the proposal will neither be identified nor examined.
42 Memorandum from Suzanne Brown Walsh and Naomi Cahn to the Drafting Comm. on Fiduciary
Access to Dig. Assets (FADA) (Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2012nov1 1%20_FADAMtg_IssuesMemo.pdf.
43 See, e.g., Letter from Allison S. Bohm, Advocacy and Policy Strategist, Am. Civil Liberties Un-
ion Found. to Suzanne Brown Walsh, Chair, Unif. Law Comm'n and Professor Naomi Cahn, Reporter,
Unif. Law Comm'n (July 3, 2013), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20
Access%20to%2ODigital%20Assets/2013jul3_FADACommentsACLU.pdf [hereinafter Bohm Letter];
Letter from Richard 0. Rash and Diane H. Rash to Suzanne Brown Walsh, Principal, Cummings & Lock-
wood LLC (July 5, 2013), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%
20Digital%20Assets/2013jul5_FADACommentsRash.pdf [hereinafter Rash Letter]; Letter from Steve
DelBianco, Exec. Dir., NetChoice, Carl M. Szabo, Policy Counsel, NetChoice, and James J. Halpert, Gen.
Counsel, State Privacy & Security Coalition to Suzanne Brown Walsh (July 8, 2013), http://www.uni-
formlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20As-
sets/2013julFADANetChoiceSzabo%20et%20alComments.pdf [hereinafter DelBianco, et al. Let-
ter].




45 Id. § 4.
46 See Legislation, UNIF. LAW COMM'N, http://uniformlaws.org/Legislation.aspx?title=Fiduciary+
Access+to+Digital+Assets (use navigation tools to show "All" Bill Dates by state) (last visited Aug. 20,
2016).
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of wills was set to change at an unfathomable pace compared to its histori-
cally glacial rate of change.
Whatever momentum had propelled UFADAA in mid-2014, however,
quickly dissipated-or perhaps more accurately, came to a screeching halt.47
A number of the parties that had submitted comments on UFADAA during
its drafting stage launched lobbying efforts to block passage of the model
law.48 The basic objection focused on privacy-related concerns associated
with a personal representative's ability to access information in an online ac-
count by default.49 Furthermore, some big tech companies, like Yahoo!, as-
serted that permitting such access violated the terms of service agreements
between the company and the deceased account holder.so The lobbying ef-
forts of those against passage proved most persuasive, as twenty-five of the
twenty-six UFADAA based bills considered by state legislatures during the
2014-2015 legislative sessions failed to become law.1
Rather than negotiate with the ULC to seek a compromise that ad-
dressed its concerns, one of the proposal's chief opponents, NetChoice,
drafted its own proposal as an alternative to the ULC's work product.5 2
NetChoice describes itself as "an association of eCommerce businesses and
online consumers who share the goal of promoting convenience, choice, and
commerce on the net."5 3 The phrase "an association of eCommerce busi-
nesses" understates the influence likely wielded by certain of its members,
which includes Google, Facebook, Yahoo!, eBay, PayPal, and other weighty
tech organizations. NetChoice's proposal, The Privacy Expectation Afterlife
and Choices Act (PEAC),54 occupies the opposite end of the privacy spectrum
47 Morgan M. Weiner, Opposition to the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, NAT'L L.
REv. (Jul. 21, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/opposition-to-uniform-fiduciary-access-to-
digital-assets-act.
48 Id.; Carly Ziegler, Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets and Accounts-Uniform Fiduciary Access
to Digital Assets Act "UFADAA ", NAT'L L. REv. (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/fiduciary-access-to-digital-assets-and-accounts-uniform-fiduciary-access-to-digital-.
49 Ziegler, supra note 48.
50 Id.; Bill Ashworth, Your Digital Will: Your Choice, YAHOO! (Sept. 15, 2014), https://yahoo
policy.tumblr.com/post/97570901633/your-digital-will-your-choice.
51 Weiner, supra note 47. For a list of states that introduced a bill based upon the Committee's
proposal, see Legislation, UNIF. LAW COMM'N, supra note 46.
52 See Anne W. Coventry & Karin Prangley, Status of the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital
Assets Act. Not Enacted Anywhere . . . Yet., AM. BAR ASS'N. (May 20, 2015), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/rpteereport/2015/3-May/practice-alert.authcheckdam.pdf;
Letter from Carl Szabo, Policy Counsel, NetChoice, to Matthew Shepherd, Representative, Ark. House
of Representatives (Feb. 18, 2015), https://netchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/NetChoice-Opposition-to-
AR-HB-1362.pdf.
53 NETCHOICE, https://NetChoice.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2016).




when compared to the ULC's model law." Under PEAC, a personal repre-
sentative does not have default access to a decedent's digital assets, but may
gain access under specific circumstances, such as when a court issues an or-
der directing access.5 6 However, unlike the widespread introduction of the
ULC's law into state legislatures, PEAC has only been placed on the legisla-
tive agenda in four states thus far, and only one of those states, Virginia,
enacted a form of the PEAC in 2015." Thus, ironically, the number of states
that have codified PEAC and UFADAA to date is equal.
Although the ULC's 2014 effort stalled in state legislatures around the
nation, it did not permit PEAC to monopolize legislative attention. Within
one year of passing its 2014 model act, the ULC passed a revised version of
the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act ("RUFADAA")." The
ULC responded to the criticisms aimed at the 2014 act by enacting provisions
more closely aligned with PEAC on the issue of privacy of digital assets in
comparison its predecessor." More fundamentally, the evolution of
UFADAA into RUFADAA seemed to occur without much consideration of
the decedent's possible interest in post-mortem privacy of account infor-
mation.6 0 Nevertheless, RUFADAA has been placed on the legislative
agenda in thirty-one states.' Furthermore, in a strange twist of legislative
fate, NetChoice now supports RUFADAA and describes its provisions as
"privacy-centric."6 2 Some of UFADAA's other opponents, however, have yet
55 Compare id, with UFADAA, supra note 44. See also Coventry & Prangley, supra note 52.
56 PEAC, supra note 54, § 1(B)(c).
57 See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-109-15 (2015); see also Assemb. B. 691, 2015-2016 Leg. Sess. (Cal.
2016), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?billid=201520160AB691; H.B. 2647,
78th Or. Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015), https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2015R1/
Downloads/MeasureDocument/HB2647; Task Force on Digital Information Privacy Summary of Pro-
ceedings, Task Force on Dig. Info. Privacy (Wyo. 2014), http://legisweb.state.wy.us/interim
Committee/2014/SDIMIN0731.pdf. For more information on Virginia's enactment of PEAC, see gener-
ally Mark Obenshain & Jay Leftwich, Protecting the Digital Afterlife: Virginia's Privacy Expectation
Afterlife and Choices Act, 19 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 39 (2015).
58 REVISED UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT (2015) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%2Digital%2Assets/
2015_RUFADAAFinal%2OAct_2016mar8.pdf [hereinafter RUFADAA].
59 Compare id, with UFADAA, supra note 44.
60 Compare UFADAA, supra note 44, with RUFADAA § 6, supra note 58.
61 Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, Revised (2015), UNIF. LAW COMM'N, http://www.uni-
formlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%2Assets%2Act,%
2 Re-
vised%20%282015%29 (last accessed Aug. 26, 2016).
62 Two-Pager on the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (Revised), NETCHOICE,
https://NetChoice.org/wp-content/uploads/Uniform-Fiduciary-Access-to-Digital-Assets-Act-Revised-
2 -
pager.pdf (last accessed Aug. 28, 2016) [hereinafter NetChoice Two-Pager].
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to stake out legislative positions on RUFADAA;" therefore, another legisla-
tive battle over the issues of access to and disclosure of the contents of a
decedent's digital assets remains a distinct possibility.
The purpose of this Article is to inject consideration into the legislative
calculus that has been largely absent from the debate engulfing RUFADAA
and PEAC-a decedent's interest in posthumous privacy-and to integrate
that interest into proposals regarding post-mortem access to digital assets.
Part I canvasses the history of the legal response to the issue of post-mortem
access to digital assets from the first statutes to the current model statutes,
RUFADAA and PEAC. Traditional law posits that an individual does not
have an interest in privacy after death, but Part II contends that an individual
does, in fact, have such an interest. To support this assertion, Part II argues
that the justifications for the privacy protections afforded to decedents under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPPA")
and the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") warrant the recognition of
posthumous privacy for digital assets. Because current proposals place focus
on the interests of online service providers rather than the intent for posthu-
mous privacy, Part III refocuses legislative analysis to include decedent in-
tent. Factoring posthumous privacy into the regulatory equation yields a de-
fault rule of non-disclosure for intestate estates and a default rule of disclo-
sure if a provision for disclosure is included in a testator's will. Finally, the
Article concludes that breaking from the traditional limitation of privacy to
consider decedent intent regarding post-mortem access to and disclosure of
digital assets effectuates the fundamental maxim of the law of wills: honoring
a decedent's intent.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW GOVERNING POST-MORTEM ACCESS TO
DIGITAL ASSETS
Aided by the clarity of hindsight, the clash of digitization with the ad-
ministration of decedent estates appears to have been inevitable. On one
hand, the metamorphosis from the shoebox to the cloud for storage purposes
not only permitted paperless business transactions, but has also allowed ac-
count holders to retain valued property in password-protected online ac-
counts for extended periods of time.64 Whatever the value of online property
happens to be, even if the value is entirely subjective it is affixed to property
that individuals may want to transfer at death." Photos stored in one's Flickr6 6
63 See Levin & Brooks, supra note 23 (writing that although some online service providers support
the ULC's revisions, "[njothing is guaranteed ... and it's still unclear whether the consumer privacy
groups will come on board").
64 See Siciliano, supra note 37.
65 id
66 About Flickr, FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com/about (last visited Aug. 10, 2016).
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account are unlikely to sell on the open market, but an individual may wish
to pass those photos to others at death. After the death of an account holder,
personal representatives have a fiduciary duty to pay a decedent's debts, col-
lect a decedent's property, and distribute such property under the terms of a
decedent's will or according to a state's scheme for intestacy.6 7 As paperless
transactions increased due to the efficiency of online transactions and envi-
ronmental concerns," personal representatives found it increasingly neces-
sary to access online accounts during estate administration. However, despite
the converging paths of online storage and estate administration, the issue of
post-mortem access to online accounts failed to capture legislative attention
until recently.6 9 This Part traces the evolution of the legal response to the
problem of post-mortem access to a decedent's digital assets from the first
state statutes to the current model acts slated for broad consideration.
A. First and Second Generation State Statutes
The legislative impetus for the first state statute to address access to a
decedent's online accounts illustrates the impediment to estate administration
caused by the transition from an offline to an online world. Following the
death of her husband and business partner, a surviving wife sought access to
her late husband's email account to discover information related to their busi-
ness.70 The Internet service provider, however, refused to provide access to
the email account." In response to the problem faced by the surviving spouse,
who happened to be a constituent of the sponsoring legislator, a Connecticut
state legislator introduced "An Act Concerning Access to a Decedent's Email
Accounts" to the state legislature in 2005.72 The proposal required an Internet
service provider "to provide access to electronic mail accounts and other
electronic data in the name of a deceased person" after receiving evidence of
67 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-703 (2016); IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1 (2016); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 395.001 (West current through the end of the 2016 regular session); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 62-
3-703 (2009 & Supp. 2015); WIS. STAT. § 857.03 (2016).
68 See, e.g., Overview, PAYITGREEN, http://www.payitgreen.org/business (last visited Aug. 31,
2016) (encouraging businesses and individuals to engage in paperless transactions as an environmental
measure).
69 See Jim Lamm, Delaware Enacts Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, DIGITAL PASSING (Aug.
27, 2014) http://www.digitalpassing.com/2014/08/27/delaware-enacts-fiduciary-access-digital-assets-
act/; see also, e.g., MICH. H. JUDICIARY COMM., LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS OF H.B. 5366-5370, at 2 (Nov.
6, 2014), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2013-2014/billanalysis/House/pdf/2013-HLA-5366-
EBOC233D.pdf.
70 CONN. JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT ON AN ACT CONCERNING ACCESS TO DECEDENT'S
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the account holder's death." Although the proposal became law, the language
of the final public act excluded the phrase "other electronic data," thereby
limiting the disclosure requirement to email accounts only.74 Nevertheless,
Connecticut General Statute § 45a-334a represents the first legislative re-
sponse to the problem of gathering information about a decedent stored in an
online account."
Connecticut's foresight did not cross many state lines, as only two states
followed its lead-and even then, not until a full two years had passed."
6 In
2007, the Indiana legislature considered a bill that required a "custodian" to
provide "access to or copies of any documents or information of the deceased
person stored electronically by the custodian" after receiving proof of the
user's death." Notably, the legislative synopsis of the bill informed legisla-
tors that "[e]lectronic documents are estate property," which is one of the
earliest legislative denominations of online assets as "property."" During that
same year, Rhode Island state legislators contemplated a bill that required an
"electronic mail service provider" to give a personal representative "access
to or copies of the contents of the electronic mail account" of a decedent if
sufficient proof of the account holder's death is furnished to the service pro-
vider." Both measures received unanimous votes of approval and became
part of the statutory codes of each state."
While they may have been prescient, the first generation statutory re-
sponses in Connecticut, Indiana, and Rhode Island are now criticized for be-
ing out-of-date for the modern digital world." Indeed, the growth in paperless
transactions, the proliferation of online storage, and the ever-increasing spec-
trum of online services make the requirement of disclosing only the contents
of an email account seem antiquated. At the time of Connecticut's legislation
73 S.B. 262, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2005), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/
tob/s/2005SB-00262-R00-SB.htm.
74 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts 05-136, https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/ACT/PA/2005PA-00136-ROOSB-
00262-PA.htm; see also Matthew D. Glennon, A Call to Action: Why the Connecticut Legislature Should
Solve the Digital Asset Dilemma, 28 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 48, 50-54 (2014).
75 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a (West 2015).
76 See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2015) (under the heading of "Electronically stored documents of
deceased"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (2015) (entitled "Access to a decedent's electronic mail").
17 S.B. 212, 2007 Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007), http://www.in.gov/legislative/
bills/2007/IN/IN0212.1 .html.
78 Id
79 H.B. 5647, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2007), http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/
BillText/BillText07/HouseTextO7/H5647A.pdf; S.B. 0732, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2007),
http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText/BillText07/SenateText07/SO732.pdf.
80 IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2015) (under the heading of "Electronically stored documents of de-
ceased"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (2015) (entitled "Access to a decedents' electronic mail").
81 Lamm, supra note 69 (noting that an additional criticism is the statutory limitation providing
access to personal representatives only, which omits others in fiduciary relationships that might need ac-
cess to information stored in online accounts).
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in 2005, for example, Facebook had only one million users.8 2 A decade later,
one billion people logged onto Facebook in a single day on August 24,
2015." Recognizing the shift in the online world, a Connecticut legislator
recently introduced a bill to commission a study of access to decedent "elec-
tronic accounts" in conjunction with estate administration.8 4 The phrase
"electronic accounts" comprehends broader access concerns than those ani-
mating Connecticut's current law limiting access to email accounts." None-
theless, legislators can hardly be faulted for failing to foresee that the online
world would expand to the point that one billion people would use an online
social network in one day. To that end, outdated statutes are not necessarily
useless statutes-a personal representative still has the ability to discover
debts, creditors, or property stored in an email account that might ease the
administration of a decedent's estate.
After a three-year hiatus, the issue of post-mortem access again gar-
nered legislative attention as the second generation of statutes went into the
books between 2010 and 2014. Oklahoma's statute, enacted in 2010, pro-
vides a personal representative with the authority "to take control of, conduct,
continue, or terminate any accounts of a deceased person on any social net-
working website, any microblogging or short message service website or any
e-mail service websites."" One year later, Idaho granted access to personal
representatives using similar statutory language." In 2014, Louisiana added
to the second generation of statutes by requiring "any person that electroni-
cally stores, maintains, manages, controls, operates, or administers the digital
accounts of a decedent" to "transfer, deliver, or provide . .. access or posses-
sion of any digital account" after receiving proof of the account holder's
death.8 9 According to the statute, a "digital account" includes everything from
an email account to a "financial account Internet website."9 0 Contemporary
82 Our History, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/Company-Info/ (use website
controls to navigate to "Dec. 1, 2004" on the timeline) (last accessed Aug. 10, 2016).
83 Id. (use website controls to navigate to "Aug. 24, 2015" on the timeline).
84 H.R. 5227, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/
TOB/H1/2013HB-05227-R00-HB.htm.
85 See id. ("[The] study [shall] include, but not be limited to, an examination of the executor's or
administrator's ability to distribute assets maintained in an electronic financial account by the decedent.").
86 See Molly Wilkens, Privacy and Security During Life, Access After Death: Are They Mutually
Exclusive?, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 1037, 1046-47 (2011) ("Without access to, or knowledge of, relevant email
accounts, awareness of online financial transactions could disappear entirely upon the death of the account
holder.") (footnote omitted).
87 58 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 269 (West 2016).
88 IDAHO CODE § 15-3-715 (2015).
89 LA. CODE CtV. PROC. ANN. art. 3191(D)(1) (2015). The personal representative must gain access
within thirty days of providing evidence of the account holder's death. Id.
90 Id. art. 3191(H) (2015) ("[T]he term 'digital account' shall include any account of the decedent
on any social networking Intemet website, web log Internet website, microblog service Intemet website,
short message service Intemet website, electronic mail service Intemet website, financial account Internet
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online activity encompasses far more than sending and receiving emails;
therefore, the second generation of statutes more accurately reflect the mod-
em online world when compared to their statutory predecessors.
9'
Despite generational differences in the types of online accounts cov-
ered, both first and second-generation statutes attracted considerable legisla-
tive support at all stages of the legislative process.92 The favorable reception,
of course, does not mean that bills were not subjected to modification during
the numerous hearings, debates, and votes that comprise typical legislative
procedures.9 3 To the contrary, several second-generation proposals were
amended prior to final passage.9 4 Nevertheless, each of the bills became law
website, or any similar electronic services or records, together with any words, characters, codes, or con-
tractual rights necessary to access such digital assets and any text, images, multimedia information, or
other personal property stored by or through such digital account.").
91 Two more state statutes were enacted between 2010 and 2014. However, each statute falls short
of granting wide access for purposes of estate administration. Virginia Code § 64.2-110, enacted in 2013,
provides a personal representative of a minor's estate with access to a "digital account," but does not grant
equivalent access to the personal representative of an adult decedent. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110 (2015).
Nevada's provision, enacted in 2014, permits a personal representative "to direct the termination of any
account of the decedent," which includes emails accounts as well as social networking accounts. NEV.
REV. STAT. § 143.188 (2015). As a result, Nevada's law does not permit access for purposes of disclosing
account contents as part of estate administration. The personal representative merely possesses the power
to terminate the digital account.
92 See, e.g., JUDICIARY COMM., SESS. YEAR 2005, VOTE TALLY SHEET, S.B. 212 (Conn. 2005),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/ts/s/2005SB-00262-ROOJUD-CV76-TS.htm; H. COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
115TH GEN. ASSEMB., COMM. REP. ON S.B. 212 (Ind. 2007), http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/
2007/PDF/HCRP/DPO21201.001.pdf; S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 115TH GEN. ASSEMB., COMM. REP. FOR
S.B. 212 (Ind. 2007), http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2007/PDF/SCRP/DPO21201.001.pdf; H.
JUDICIARY, RULES, & ADMIN. COMM., 2011 SESS., MINUTES - MONDAY, FEB. 23, 2011 (Idaho 2011),
https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2011/standingcommittees/hjudmin.pdf; S. JUDICIARY & RULES
COMM., 2011 SESS., MINUTES - MONDAY, FEB. 7, 2011 (Idaho 2011), https://legislature.idaho.
gov/sessioninfo/201 /standingcommittees/sjudmin.pdf; H.J. 28, 2014 REG. SESS., at 37-38 (La. 2014),
http://house.louisiana.gov/HJournals/HJournals_All/2014_RSJoumals/14RS%20-%20HJ%200428
%2028.PDF; S.J. 5, 2014 REG. SESS., at 7 (La. 2014), http://senate.1a.gov/sessioninfo/joumals/201
4 /0 3 -
18-2014.pdf
93 See, e.g., S. JUDICIARY & RULES COMM., S.B. 1044 (Idaho 2011), http://legislature.idaho.gov/
legislation/2011/S1044.htm; NEV. LEG., 2013 SESS., S.B. 131 (2013), http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session
/77th201 3/Reports/history.cfm?ID=338.
94 See bill information cited supra note 93.
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with little to no legislative opposition.9 5 In fact, all but one of the bills grant-
ing post-mortem access to online accounts received unanimous support."
Counting the total yea and nay votes cast in state legislatures during votes on
both first and second-generation statutes yields a total of 743 yeas and 18
nays.17 The eighteen nay votes were cast against he proposal debated in Lou-
isiana's state legislature, and even there, the 18 votes against enactment were
dwarfed by the 105 votes in favor of Louisiana's bill."
The bipartisan support for access to a decedent's online accounts is not
only eye opening in terms of a one sided tally, but is significant given the
infrequency of such cooperation in today's political environment. One reason
for the overwhelming support of the access measures can be found in the
fiscal impact statements associated with each legislative bill.9 9 States that
95 CONN. GEN. ASSEMB., SESS. YEAR 2005, VOTE FOR SB-262 ROLL CALL No. 289 (2005),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/vote/h/2005HV-00289-R00SB00262-HV.htm (143 Yeas, 0 Nays); CONN.
GEN. ASSEMB., SESS. YEAR 2005, VOTE FOR SB-262 SEQUENCE No. 193 (2005), https://www.
cga.ct.gov/2005/vote/s/2005SV-00193-R00SB00262-SV.htm (34 Yeas, 0 Nays); IND. H.R., 115TH GEN.
ASSEMB., ROLL CALL 356 (2007), http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2007/PDF/Hrollcal/0356.PDF.pdf
(96 Yeas, 0 Nays); IND. S., 115TH GEN. ASSEMB., ROLL CALL NO.: 112 (2007), http://www.in.
gov/legislative/bills/2007/PDF/Srollcal/01 2.PDF.pdf (48 Yeas, 0 Nays); 134 J.H.R. No. 65, 2007 SESS.,
at 99 (R.I. 2007), http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/Journals07/HouseJoumalsO7/HJoumal6-22.pdf (60
yeas, 0 Nays); 134 S.J. NO. 58, 2007 SESS., at 74 (R.I. 2007), http://webserver.rilin.state.
ri.us/Joumals07/SenateJoumals07/SJournal6-22.pdf (33 Yeas, 0 Nays); OICLA. STATE LEG., 2010 REG.
SESS., HB2800 B. TRACKING REP. (2010), http://www.okhouse.gov/Joumals/HJ2010/2010%
20Hleg%20Day24.pdf (74 Ayes, 0 Nays); S.J. 46, 52ND LEG., 2D REG. SESS., at 1352 (Okla. 2010),
http://www.oksenate.gov/publications/senate journals/sj20lO/sj20100421.pdf (46 Ayes, 0 Nays); S.
JUDICIARY & RULES COMM., S.B. 1044 (Idaho 2011), https://legislature.idaho.gov/legislation
/201 1/S1044.htm (64 Ayes, 0 Nays (House); 34 Ayes, 0 Nays (Senate)); H.J. 48, 2014 REG. SESS., at 86-
87 (La. 2014), http://house.louisiana.gov/H_Journals/HJournalsAll/2014_RSJournals/14RS%20-
%20HJ%200530%2048.PDF (75 Yeas, 18 Nays); S.J. 45,2014 REG. SESS., at 31-32 (La. 2014), http://sen-
ate.1a.gov/sessioninfo/joumals/2014/06-01-2014.pdf (38 Yeas, O Nays). The votes in Virginia and Nevada
were similar. For information about the votes in those two states, see VA. LEG. INFO. SYS., HB 1752 S.:
PASSED S. WITH SUBSTITUTION, 2013 SESS. (Va. 2013), http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-
bin/legp604.exe?131+vot+SVO637HB1752+HB1752 (40 Yeas, 0 Nays); VA. LEG. INFO. SYS., HB 1752
HOUSE: VOTE: PASSAGE, 2013 SESS. (Va. 2013), http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp6O4.exe?131+
vot+HV1098+HB1752 (95 Yeas, 0 Nays)); NEV. LEG., 77TH SESS., VOTE ON SB131 (ST REPRINT) ON S.
FINAL PASSAGE (2013), http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Reports/BillVote.cfm?VotelD=
274&fldReprint=1&fldDocTypeCode=SB&fldBillNumber-131&fldBillname=SB131(20 Yeas, 0 Nays)
NEV. LEG., 77TH SESS., VOTE ON SB131 (3D REPRINT) ON ASSEMB. FINAL PASSAGE (2013),
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Reports/BillVote.cfm?VotelD=1959&fldRe-
print=3&fldDocTypeCode=SB&fldBillNumber-131&fldBillname=SBl31(40 Yeas, 0 Nays).
96 See legislature votes cited supra note 95.
97 See id. These sums tally the votes cast in each branch of a state legislature that passed a post-
mortem access statute. They exclude Virginia and Nevada because of the differences in those statutes
compared to the other first and second generation statutes. See supra note 91. If the votes from Virginia
and Nevada are included, the tally becomes 938 in favor and 18 against.
98 H.J. 48,2014 REG. SESS., at 86-87 (La. 2014); S.J. 45, 2014 REG. SESS., at 31-32 (La. 2014).
99 See, e.g., LEG. SERVS. AGENCY, OFFICE OF FISCAL & MGMT. ANALYSIS, 115TH GEN. ASSEMB.,
FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT S.B. 212 (Ind. 2007), http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2007/PDF/
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passed the first and second-generation statutes generally concluded that man-
dating post-mortem access to an online account had no fiscal impact on the
state's budget.'o Connecticut, for example, summarily found that "[t]he bill
makes a minor change to the statutes involving the disclosure of certain in-
formation pursuant to the execution or administration of an estate. This
change has no fiscal impact."' Finding that there is no financial effect on
the state's budget does not mean that requiring post-mortem access is a cost-
free transaction, but only that whatever costs are associated with the legisla-
tion will not be paid out of the state's bank account.'0 2 As a result, a final vote
that is largely, if not unanimously, in favor of requiring access to a decedent's
online accounts is predictable. In the absence of electoral consequences, the
transfer of transaction costs coupled with the possible benefit for estate ad-
ministration makes a legislator's decision to vote in favor of an access meas-
ure rather straightforward.
B. Seeking Post-Mortem Access In and Out of the Courtroom
Absent a state statute requiring default access or a list of accounts with
associated passwords a personal representative encounters numerous obsta-
cles when trying to settle the estate of a decedent who, like most people, lived
a portion of his life online. While punishment for violating state privacy laws
is a concern,0 3 the basic problem confronted by a personal representative
stems from terms of service agreements between a decedent and a service
provider.0 4 Some terms of service contain explicit clauses governing the
transferability of an account at death while others leave the subject open to
question. For example, Yahoo!'s terms of service declare that
[y]ou agree that your Yahoo[!] account is non-transferable and any rights to your
Yahoo! ID or contents within your account terminate upon your death. Upon receipt
FISCAL/SBO212.008.pdf; JANICE BUCHANAN, 52ND LEG. 2D SESS., BILL SUMMARY H.B. 2800 (Nev.
2010), http://webserverl.1sb.state.ok.us/CF/2009-10%20SUPPORT%20DOCUMENTS/BILLSUM/
House/HB2800%201NT%20BILLSUM.doc; STATE OF IDAHO LEG., 2011 SESS., STATEMENT OF
PURPOSE/FISCAL NOTE S.B. 1044 (2011), https://legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2011/ S1044SOP.pdf;
LA. LEG. FISCAL OFFICE, 2014 REG. SESS., FISCAL NOTE S.B. 461 (2014), http://www.legis.
la.gov/Legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=916623.
100 See fiscal impact statements cited supra note 99.
101 OFFICE OF FISCAL ANALYSIS, SESS. YEAR 2005, FISCAL NOTE S.B. 262 (Conn. 2005).
102 See id; see also fiscal impact statements cited supra note 99.
103 See Cahn et al., supra note 14, at 9.
104 See id. at 6.
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of a copy of a death certificate, your account may be terminated and all contents
therein permanently deleted.1 05
But unlike Yahoo!'s clear description of what happens at the death of the
user, Facebook's terms of service state that "[y]ou will not transfer your ac-
count . . . to anyone without first getting our written permission."1 0 6 Face-
book's provision unambiguously applies to inter vivos transfers, but leaves
post-mortem availability in doubt.o' Regardless of the clarity of the terms of
service, personal representatives are often left to ask a service provider for
access to a decedent's online account. Thus, a service provider may deny
such a request for access in reliance on its own interpretation of the terms of
service agreement.
Denials of post-mortem access to an online account that reference terms
of service agreements have sent some personal representatives to the court-
house seeking a court order to compel access.'8 In many, perhaps most, of
the instances where post-mortem access is sought, a loved one passes away,
access to an online account is requested, the online service provider denies
access, and a complaint is filed seeking compulsory disclosure of the ac-
count's contents. An early example of the tussle between an access seeker
and an Internet service provider is the well-documented experience of Justin
Ellsworth's family.'0 9 Following Justin's death in 2004 from injuries suffered
while defusing a roadside bomb in Iraq,"' Justin's father, John Ellsworth,
sought access to his son's Yahoo! email account so that the family could
learn more about Justin's life in Iraq."' However, John did not have the pass-
word to the account; therefore, he asked Yahoo! for access."2 Yahoo! refused
to provide access to Justin's account on that ground that doing so protected
105 Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO! § 28, https://policies.yahoo.com/us/en/yahoo/terms/
utos/index.htm (last updated March 16, 2012).
106 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK § 4(9), https://www.facebook.com
/legal/terms (last revised Jan. 30, 2015).
107 Stephanie Buck, How 1 Billion People are Coping with Death and Facebook, MASHABLE.COM
(Feb. 13, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/02/13/facebook-after-death/#36W5nIoOpiqV.
108 See Cahn et al., supra note 14, at 7.
109 The struggle to obtain Justin Ellsworth's emails has been discussed in numerous academic and
practitioner journals. See, e.g., Banta, supra note 34, at 833; Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, Digital
Planning: The Future of Elder Law, 9 NAELA J. 135, 148 (2013); Jason Mazzone, Facebook's Afterlife,
90 N.C. L. REv. 1643, 1664 (2012); Greg Lastowka & Trisha Hall, Living and Dying in a Virtual World,
284 N.J. LAW., Oct. 2013, at 29, 30.
110 Joel Thurtell & Cecil Angel, Marine Dies Trying to Save Others, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 16,
2004), http://www.justinellsworth.net/articles/detroit%20free%20press%20nov%2016.htm.
111 Yahoo to Preserve E-Mail of Marine Killed in Iraq, USA TODAY (March 1, 2005), http://usato-
day30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-03-01-yahoo-email-savex.htm. For a description of similar situa-
tions, see, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, After Death, A Fight for Digital Memories: No Clear Laws of Inher-
itance Cover Web Data, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/arti-
cles/A58836-2005Feb2.html.
112 Yahoo to Preserve Email, supra note 1 11.
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the privacy of the account."3 Furthermore, Yahoo!'s terms of service stated
that an account terminates at death, and that an inactive account can be ter-
minated after a period of inactivity." 4 With the clock running, John filed suit
in a Michigan court seeking to compel Yahoo! to release the contents of Jus-
tin's email account."' The court ordered Yahoo! to transfer the contents of
Justin's account, and Yahoo! voluntarily complied with the order."' Yahoo!
delivered a CD to John Ellsworth containing 10,000 pages of material from
Justin's account."' Despite receiving the information, the process of obtain-
ing that information exacted an emotional toll on the Ellsworth family."'
Terms of service not only impede access for those without a password,
but also for those who possess an account's password because of a decedent's
planning or happenstance. After the death of her son in a motorcycle acci-
dent, Karen Williams sought access to his Facebook account, but did not have
the account's password."9 Williams contacted Facebook seeking access, but
one of her son's friends provided "a tip" about the password that allowed her
to discern the password and access the account.'2 0 According to Williams,
"[ilt was like a gift."' 2 ' Accessing her son's account, however, violated Fa-
cebook's terms of service regarding unauthorized access; therefore, Face-
book changed the password to the account, thereby barring Williams' ac-
cess.'2 2 Williams filed suit to access the account and prevailed, but only after
a two-year legal battle.'23 Although successful in the courtroom, Williams
only obtained access to the account for ten months, at which point Facebook
terminated the account.'2 4 The legal victory fell short of the desired "full and
113 id
114 The Abrams Report, MSNBC (Dec. 21, 2004), http://www.justinellsworth.net/email/abrams
%20rpt.htm (transcript of an MSNBC television broadcast discussing the ban on transfer as a barrier to
disclosure).
115 Paul Sancya, Yahoo Will Give Family Slain Marine's E-Mail Account, USA TODAY (April 21,
2005), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-04-21-marine-e-mailx.htm.
116 id
117 Jennifer Chambers, Family Gets GI's Email, DETROIT NEWS (April 21, 2005), http://wwwjusti-
nellsworth.net/email/detnewsapr.htm (also noting that the CD delivered by Yahoo did not contain any of
the messages written by Justin. John Ellsworth thought that "maybe that's all [Justin] had." Yahoo was
apparently attempting to "resolve the confusion over the CD").
118 Id. (describing the various emotions experienced throughout the process).





122 Id. (describing the justification for termination as "company policy").
123 Karen Williams' Facebook Saga Raises Questions of Whether User's Profiles Are Part of 'Dig-





unobstructed access,"l25 but it represents more than a symbolic victory-Wil-
liams obtained access despite the terms of service, even if only for a limited
amount of time.
Despite legal confrontations that have resulted in court-ordered access,
published opinions offering insight into judicial views about disputes over
access to online accounts are sparse. One exception to that scarcity is Ajemian
v. Yahoo!, Inc..126 In Ajemian, the co-administrators of a decedent's estate
requested information that was in decedent's Yahoo! email account, and Ya-
hoo! agreed to provide header information associated with the account's
emails, but not the content of those emails.127 Later, and maybe predictably,
the representatives sought a court order to compel disclosure of the content
of the email messages on the ground that the email messages constituted
property of the decedent.'2 8 Yahoo! challenged the request, relying upon sev-
eral provisions of the terms of service governing civil procedure.'2
9 Con-
travening the property assertion of the complainants, Yahoo! argued that
"emails in the account are not property of the estate."'0 Furthermore, Yahoo!
claimed that revealing email content, even to an administrator of a decedent's
estate, would violate the SCA."' The court decided the case on procedural
grounds without reaching the merits of the property claim;'3 2 therefore, the
question regarding ownership and access to the contents of the account went
unresolved. Nevertheless, Ajemian's facts demonstrate that while estate rep-
resentatives may obtain a catalogue of account information through negotia-
tion, attempts to acquire account content may be resisted based upon terms
of service agreements and federal privacy law.
Obstacles notwithstanding, estate representatives often gain access to
an online account one way or another. Some, like Karen Williams, obtain
account information by court order, while others, like the plaintiffs in
Ajemian, secure information from an online account by negotiation. What-
ever the route to relief, interested parties may not retrieve all of the desired
125 id.
126 987 N.E.2d 604 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
127 Id. at 608-09. Yahoo! did not challenge the court order for header information. Id.
128 Id. at 609.
129 Id. (noting that Yahoo! argued that he terms of service provisions required that the suit be brought
in California and contained a one-year statute of limitations rendering the suit untimely. Yahoo! also
asserted that res judicata barred the claim.).
130 Id. at 610.
131 Id. at 609. Yahoo! asserted the SCA argument in a footnote. Id. at 615. Interestingly, one of the
co-administrators of the decedent's estate opened the email account for the decedent, had "continued to
access the account from time to time," but had "forgotten the password." Id. at 608. The co-administrators
sought access on the basis of the co-ownership of one of the co-administrators in the second complaint.
Id. at 609. Yet, Yahoo still refused to provide access to the account. Id. at 609-10.
132 Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 615-16 (basing the ruling on forum selection and limitations clauses in
the terms of service agreement without deciding whether the contents of the emails were property of
decedent's estate).
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information from a decedent's online account. Like the short lived relief
awarded to Karen Williams,'33 the 10,000 pages of material on the CD
awarded to John Ellsworth did not contain any of the messages that his son
had sent to others.13 4 Similarly, the initial negotiations between Ajemian's
representatives and Yahoo! resulted in a partial catalog of the account's con-
tents-header information detailing the communicating parties and the date
of the messages-but no content.' Court filings, time, and energy consum-
ing negotiations may be just the first step of a long path toward the desired
"full and unobstructed access" to a decedent's online accounts.'36
On a fundamental level, the foregoing examples represent a tug-of-war
between two basic principles-property rights versus the right to privacy.
From the perspective of access seekers, the information in the online account
is property owned by the account user to be distributed at the user's death.
Karen Williams argued, for example, that "[i]f [the online account] w[as] a
box of letters under his bed, no one would have thought twice."'"3 On the
other hand, online service providers are ceaselessly concerned with the pri-
vacy of their consumers in an age of hacking and phishing. Following the
conclusion of the Ellsworth legal battle and the delivery of the CD, a repre-
sentative for Yahoo! stated that it was "pleased the court has issued an order
resolving this matter ... and allowing Yahoo! to uphold our privacy commit-
ment to our users."138 In addition to the individual privacy settings available
to its users,'39 Facebook's Data Policy states that "[w]e may access, preserve
and share your information in response to a legal request (like a search war-
rant, court order or subpoena) if we have a good faith belief that the law re-
quires us to do so."140 From the perspective of the online service provider,
whatever property rights a decedent may have in the contents of an account
are trumped by the provider's commitment to the privacy interests of its us-
ers.
133 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
134 See Chambers, supra note 117 (describing the CD as containing some "numerical gibberish."
After being contacted by the family, Yahoo! claimed that it was "attempting to resolve the confusion over
the CD").
135 Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 609.
136 See Chambers, supra note 123 and accompanying text.
137 Mother Fights for Access to her Deceased Son's Facebook Account, CBC NEWS (Mar. 1,2013),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/mother-fights-for-access-to-her-deceased-son-s-facebook-account-
1.1327683. See also Tom Hauser, Family Fights to Access Late Son's Digital Data, KTSP.COM (Jan. 21,
2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20150124034257/http://kstp.com/article/stories/s3682368.shtm
("'Imagine if your bank chose to treat your assets in the same way [that digital data is treated] ....
138 Chambers, supra note 117.
139 See Facebook Privacy Basics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/basics (last visited
Aug. 8,2016).




C. Third Generation Uniform Statutes
According to a study conducted by the Pew Research Center, only 7%
of American adults used social networking sites at the time Connecticut en-
acted the first access statute in 2005.1' By 2015, the percentage of American
adults using such sites had rocketed to 65%.142 Despite the proliferation of
the online world and media coverage of disputes between access seekers and
service providers, a mere nine states had enacted access statutes by the end
of 2014.14 The absence of statutory guidance not only created legal uncer-
tainty in states without a statute, but also risked waste given the potential
value of data stored in online accounts. And to the extent statutory law ex-
isted in 2014, statutes differed in the types of accounts that could be accessed
by a personal representative as well as the authority granted to a personal
representative to handle account information.114 While Connecticut requires
an online service provider to provide "access to or copies of the contents of'
a decedent's email account,'45 Oklahoma authorizes personal representatives
to access a wide variety of digital accounts and permits an array of actions to
be taken regarding those accounts, including termination.'46 Furthermore,
ambiguity in terms of service agreements regarding the status of an account
following a user's death, as well as uncertainty about liability under state or
federal privacy laws, only added to the challenges faced by personal repre-
sentatives during estate administration.147 In short, unpredictability pervaded
the issue of post-mortem access to digital assets.
The muddled legal landscape and the probable increase of access prob-
lems in the future prompted the Uniform Law Commission to address the
problem of post-mortem access to online accounts in 2011.14' After a three-
year drafting process, the ULC introduced the first of the third generation
statutes in 2014, the Uniform Access to Digital Assets Act.149 The first sen-
tence of UFADAA declares that "[t]he purpose of this Act is to vest fiduci-
141 Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005-2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.
pewintemet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/.
142 Id.
143 See Alexandra Elliott, Comment, Death and Social Media Implications for the Young and Will-
less, 55 JURIMETRICSJ. 381, 394-96 (2015). The states are: Connecticut (2005), Delaware (2014), Indiana
(2007), Rhode Island (2007), Oklahoma (2010), Idaho (2011), Virginia (2011), Nevada (2013), and Lou-
isiana (2014).
144 See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
145 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a(b) (West 2015).
146 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 269 (West 2016).
147 See Elliott, supra note 143, at 396-97.
148 See Hennig Letter, supra note 41.
149 UFADAA, supra note 44.
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aries with the authority to access, control, or copy digital assets and ac-
counts."' Functionally, UFADAA sought to "remove barriers to a fiduci-
ary's access to electronic records" in the form of disparate access laws, terms
of service agreements, and privacy protections under state and federal law.'
Given the dissimilar treatment of the issue under the paucity of existing laws,
the ULC concluded "[a] uniform approach among states will provide cer-
tainty and predictability for courts, account holders, fiduciaries, and Internet
service providers."52
One of the primary challenges faced by UFADAA's drafters was how
to define a "digital asset" to be accessed upon proof of death of an account
holder. First and second-generation access statutes explicitly identified the
types of online accounts accessible by personal representatives. Connecti-
cut's statute permitted access to email accounts only while Idaho's law listed
everything from an email account to a microblog as being accessible to an
estate representative.'5 3 The problem with that approach is that identifying
the type of account with such specificity makes the statute insensitive to tech-
nological change. For example, two of today's most popular sites, Twitter
and Instagram, did not exist when Connecticut decided to grant personal rep-
resentatives access to email accounts only.'5 4 As technology advances, a pos-
itive feedback cycle develops: digital innovation attracts users and the in-
creased number of users spurs developers to innovate. As the cycle continues,
however, laws governing post-mortem access to digital assets remain frozen
on the books and eventually become outmoded.
To avoid the specification pitfall of existing statutes, comments offered
during UFADAA's drafting process stressed the importance of crafting pro-
visions that would allow the law to keep pace with technological changes
without subsequent amendment."' With that in mind, section two of
UFADAA broadly, and succinctly, defined "digital asset" to mean "a record
that is electronic.""' Parsing the definition of "digital asset" more finely,
150 Id. at 1 (Prefatory Note).
151 Id
152 id.
153 Compare 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts 05-136, https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/ACT/PA/2005PA-00136-
ROOSB-00262-PA.htm; with IDAHO CODE § 15-3-715 (2015), https://legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/
Titlel 5/TI5CH3SECT15-3-715.htm.
154 See Gerry Shih & Alexei Oreskovic, How Little 'Twitter' Became a Magnificent Money Machine,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-twitter-2013-9 (Twitter);
Instagram: A Brief History, SFGATE (Dec. 18, 2012, 10:06 PM), http://www.sfgate.com
/technology/article/Instagram-a-brief-history-4129827.php (Instagram).
155 Memorandum from Chris Kunz to Suzy Walsh and Naomi Cahn (Mar. 17,2014), http://www.uni-
formlaws.org./Conmittee.aspx?title=Fiduciary%2OAccess%20to%2ODigital%2oAssets; Letter from
John Gregory and Chris Kunz to Suzy Walsh and Naomi Cahn (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.uniform-
laws.org./Committee.aspx?title=Fiduciary%20Access%20to%2ODigital%20Assets;
156 See UFADAA, supra note 44, § 2.
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UFADAA defines "record" to mean "information that is inscribed on a tan-
gible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retriev-
able in perceivable form."'M Furthermore, "electronic" means "relating to
technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromag-
netic, or similar capabilities.""' Unlike the limited scope of coverage under
first-generation statutes and the specific enumerations of accounts in second-
generation statutes, UFADAA's definitions offer flexibility to cover what-
ever online innovation captures the market in the future.
For personal representatives and survivors of the decedent, UFADAA's
most important provision is section four, which eliminates the barriers to ac-
cess plaguing estate administration.15 9 Under section four, personal represent-
atives have a "right" to access "the content of an electronic communication"
maintained by an online service provider unless such access is barred by the
decedent's will or prohibited by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA).'6 o The ECPA permits disclosure of the content of communications
received by an individual to that individual or an agent of that individual or
a third party with the "lawful consent" of the recipient of the message.'
However, communications created by the account holder are not available to
third parties, like personal representatives, without the "lawful consent" of
the drafter.'62 In other words, a personal representative may access the content
of emails received by the decedent, but would need the "lawful consent" of
the decedent to access the content of messages sent by the decedent.'
6 3 Fur-
thermore, section four authorizes a personal representative to access a cata-
logue (not the content) of messages "sent or received" by the decedent as
well as "any other digital asset in which at death the decedent had a right or
interest."l6 In conjunction with the definition of "digital asset," UFADAA §
4 vanquishes uncertainty about access to a decedent's online accounts by es-
tablishing a default rule of access unless prohibited by a provision in the de-
cedent's will or federal law.'6 5
While it may be the most useful for parties interested in access, section
four also proved to be UFADAA's most controversial provision. During the
drafting process, a number of parties voiced concerns about breaching the
157 id.
158 id.
159 Id. § 4.
160 Id. "Content of an electronic communication" is defined as "information concerning the sub-
stance or meaning of the communication which: (A) has been sent or received by an account holder; (B)
is in electronic storage by a custodian providing an electronic-communication service to the public or is
carried or maintained by a custodian providing a remote-computing service to the public; and (C) is not
readily accessible to the public." Id. § 2(6).
161 Id. § 4 cmt.
162 UFADAA, supra note 44, § 4 cmt.
163 id.
164 Id. §§ 4(2), 4(3).
165 Id. § 4.
2052016]
GEO. MASON L. REv.
privacy of persons who had sent communications to a decedent hat remained
in the decedent's account at death.16 6 The ACLU, for example, asserted that
providing "nearly unfettered access to online accounts or online content"
risked violating the privacy of both senders and recipients of online commu-
nications.6 ' Furthermore, the ACLU noted that some accounts lacked "of-
fline equivalents," such as a profile on an Internet dating site, and that provid-
ing ready access to that material encroached upon the privacy of the deceased
account holder."' Tying UFADAA's default rule permitting access to federal
privacy law, NetChoice argued that "[t]he contents of subscriber communi-
cations may not even be disclosed by an Internet company in response to
judicial process in civil litigation" under the ECPA.'6 9 If an online service
provider disclosed the contents of an email held in a decedent's account, the
sender of the email could file suit against the disclosing service provider and
receive statutory damages and attorney's fees to remedy the ECPA viola-
tion.7 o Although the ULC anticipated privacy-related criticism and sought to
forestall it by providing two draft versions of section four,"' the final version
granted access to personal representatives by default.172
For UFADAA's critics, the ULC's drafting process represented only the
first round in the battle, as an uniform act requires state legislative action to
become law. After completing its work, the ULC promulgated UFADAA and
the effort proved successful in terms of introduction to state legislatures-
twenty-six states placed UFADAA bills on their agendas during their legis-
lative sessions."' States from Massachusetts to Hawaii, which had failed to
enact either first or second-generation statutes, appeared ready to provide
personal representatives with access to a decedent's digital assets.'7 4 Given
the voting totals associated with the passage of first and second-generation
statutes, one might have predicted that UFADAA's swift introduction into a
majority of state legislatures would mean that enactment was largely per-
functory. However, all but one of the UFADAA bills died before a vote had
166 See Bohm letter, supra note 43; DelBianco et al. Letter, supra note 43.
167 See Bohm Letter, supra note 43.
168 id
169 See DelBianco et al. Letter, supra note 43.
170 id
171 FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 4 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N, Draft 2013),
http://www.uniformlaws.org./Committee.aspx?title=Fiduciary%20Access%20to%2ODigital%2Assets
(containing two alternatives for § 4). According to the Comment for § 4, Alternative A "responds to the
concerns of internet service providers who believe that the act should be structured to clarify the difference
between fiduciary authority over digital property other than electronic communications protected by fed-
eral law (the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)), and authority over ECPA-covered elec-
tronic communications." Id. § 4 cmt. Alternative B establishes the default rule that the personal repre-
sentative is authorized to administer all of the decedent's digital property, regardless of whether it is cov-
ered by ECPA." Id. § 4 Alternative B.
172 UFADAA, supra note 58, at § 4.




been taken.'17 Only Delaware enacted a post-mortem access bill based upon
UFADAA-and it did so "before the opposition was organized."'7
The basic reason that UFADAA imploded in state legislative halls cen-
ters on the privacy-related concerns identified during the ULC's drafting pro-
cess. The Senior Legal Director at Yahoo!, for example, blogged that
UFADAA did "not ensure the privacy of sensitive or confidential infor-
mation shared by the decedent or third parties.""' Yahoo! further claimed
that UFADAA was based upon "the faulty presumption that the decedent
would have wanted the trustee to have access to his or her communica-
tions.""' Even after Delaware's legislature passed a UFADAA bill, Google,
AOL, NetChoice, and others urged Delaware's governor to veto the bill be-
cause it eliminated privacy protections for citizens of Delaware, forced ser-
vice providers to risk violations of state or federal law, and ignored terms of
service agreements between Delawareans and service providers.179 Similarly,
advocacy groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Consumer Ac-
tion lined up against UFADAA based upon privacy and autonomy con-
cerns.'" In fact, these groups sent a joint letter in opposition to UFADAA to
each state legislature considering a UFADAA bill.'"' Although the opposition
lost the fight in Delaware, opponents might justifiably conclude that they
won the legislative war given UFADAA's defeat in every other state where
the Act was considered.182
In addition to conducting an anti-UFADAA campaign, UFADAA's crit-
ics drafted an alternative statute to compete with UFADAA. The stated pur-
pose of the Privacy Expectation Afterlife Choices Act ("PEAC") is "to pro-
175 id.
176 Id.; Letter from Benjamin Oreske, Legislative Counsel, Unif. Law Comm'n, to Senator Stewart
J. Greenleaf, Chairman, Pa. Senate Judiciary Comm. (June 15, 2015), http://judiciary.pasenategop.
com/files/2015/06/Uniform-Law-Commission-Written-Testimony.pdf.
177 Bill Ashworth, Your Digital Will: Your Choice, Yahoo! Global Public Policy (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://yahoopolicy.tumblr.com/post/97570901633/your-digital-will-your-choice.
178 id
179 Zach Miners, Yahoo Slams New "Digital Will" Law, Says Users Have Privacy When They Die,
PCWORLD (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2683472/yahoo-slams-new-digital-will-
law-says-users-have-privacy-when-they-die.html (containing a link to the letter written to Delaware's
governor).
180 Letter from Daniel M. Gluck, Legal Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Haw. to Chair McKelvey
and Members of the Comm. on Consumer Prot. and Com. (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/Session20l5/Testimony/HB745_TESTIMONYCPC_02-04-15_.PDF.
181 Benjamin Feist, 2015 Legislative Session Wrap-Up, AM. Civ. L. UNION OF MINN. (2015),
https://www.aclu-mn.org/files/2714/3655/4439/2015_Legislative-Report.pdf ("The National ACLU and
other civil liberties organizations sent a letter in opposition to UFADAA to each state legislature where
the issue was introduced, including Minnesota."). Minnesota's UFADAA bill was tabled without a vote.
Id.
182 See Legislation, UNIF. LAW COMM'N, supra note 46.
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tect[] a decedent's private communications ... while facilitating administra-
tion of a decedent's estate."l83 To fulfill its purpose, PEAC differentiates ac-
cess requirements by the type of account information being sought by the
personal representative.18 4 A personal representative may receive a copy of a
record/catalogue of communications (the "to" and "from" lines in an email)
stored in the account directly from the online service provider."' Addition-
ally, a personal representative may seek disclosure of the contents of the ac-
count."' The "contents" of the account include "any information concerning
the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication."'" If the request
for access to account contents were approved, the personal representative
would obtain far more information than that offered by a record of account
contacts, as the personal representative would receive the substance of mes-
sages that were password-protected uring the account holder's life.
As between the two classifications of accessible information availa-
ble-a catalogue of correspondents and the contents of the account-the for-
mer is likely to be more important to the process of estate administration.
Because personal representatives may have difficulty identifying financial
accounts, a catalogue of account contacts "help[s] fiduciaries identify im-
portant interactions, like those with a bank or online broker, and then contact
those institutions as part of closing the account."'8 Beyond institutional iden-
tities, a list of individuals who communicated with the decedent may reveal
the identities of creditors that need to be paid, debts owed to the decedent, or
unknown assets that need to be collected. In short, a catalogue of the com-
munications sent and received by the decedent help a personal representative
fulfill her fiduciary duties in an increasingly paperless world.
Substantively, PEAC requires a personal representative to go to court to
obtain an order for disclosure regardless of the type of account information
sought. To receive a record of account communications from an online ser-
vice provider, PEAC section 1(A) declares that a personal representative
must obtain a court order that includes findings that:
(a) the user is deceased;
(b) the deceased user was the subscriber to or customer of the provider;
(c) the account(s) belonging to the deceased user have been identified with
specificity, including a unique identifier assigned by the provider;
183 PEAC, supra note 54.
184 Id at § 6.
185 Id The PEAC defines a "record" of communication as having the same meaning employed by
18 U.S.C. § 2702 of the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access
Act, which identifies exceptions for disclosure of customer records. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (2015). See
also NetChoice Two-Pager, supra note 62.
186 PEAC, supra note 54, § 1.
187 See id. § 6(A). For more on the distinction between a record and contents, see Matthew J. Tokson,
The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2105 (2009).
188 NetChoice Two-Pager, supra note 62.
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(d) there are no other authorized users or owners of the deceased user's
account(s);
(e) disclosure is not in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., 47 U.S.C. §
222, or other applicable law;
(f) the request for disclosure is narrowly tailored to effect the purpose of
the administration of the estate,
(g) the executor or administrator demonstrates a good faith belief that ac-
count records are relevant to resolve fiscal assets of the estate;
(h) the request seeks information spanning no more than a year prior to
the date of death; and
(i) the request is not in conflict with the deceased user's will or testa-
ment.89
Obtaining a record of account contacts is likely to be most useful for
personal representatives during estate administration, but the content of in-
formation held in online accounts is frequently the information most desired
by those who survive the decedent. Survivors seek content information as a
way to remember a loved one or in an attempt to understand what was hap-
pening in an individual's life just before death. Justin Ellsworth's father, for
example, doggedly pursued access to his son's Facebook account to gather
information for a scrapbook that he and his son had planned to create.' Sim-
ilarly, Bill and Kristi Anderson sought access to their son's digital assets to
search for clues that might help explain their son's "accidental" death.1 9' For
individuals in similar situations, estate administration is not about property,
but about a person. As a result, the value of an account's contents far exceeds
the value added by learning the "To" and "From" information disclosed by a
catalogue of account contacts.
To obtain the contents of an account, PEAC's section 1(B) requires a
personal representative to present an online service provider with "all of the
following:"l92
(a) A written request for the contents of deceased user's account;
(b) A copy of the death certificate of the deceased user; and
(c) An order of the court of probate that by law has jurisdiction of the estate of a
deceased user:
(i) finding that the will of the decedent or setting within the product or service
regarding how the user's contents can be treated after a set period of inactivity
or other event expressly consented to the disclosure of the contents of the de-
ceased user's account by the executor or administrator of the estate of the de-
ceased user;
189 PEAC, supra note 54, § 1. For a more detailed discussion of the relevant factors see infra notes
192-197 and accompanying text.
190 See Yahoo to Preserve E-Mail, supra note 111 (reporting that Justin and his father had discussed
creating a scrapbook to contain Justin's emails).
191 Hauser, supra note 137; see also Emily Anne Epstein, Family Fights to Access Son's Facebook
Account After His Suicide to Finally Gain Closure Over Tragic Death, DAILY MAIL (June 1, 2012),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2153548/Family-fights-access-sons-Facebook-Gmail-accounts-
suicide.htmi.
192 PEAC, supra note 54, § 1(B).
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(ii) ordering that the estate shall first indemnify the provider from all liability
in complying with the order;
(iii) finding that the user is deceased;
(iv) finding that the deceased user was the subscriber to or customer of the
provider;
(v) finding that the account(s) belonging to the deceased user have been iden-
tified with specificity, including a unique identifier assigned by the provider;
(vi) finding that there are no other authorized users or owners of the deceased
user's account(s); and
(vii) finding that disclosure of the contents is not in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2701 et seq., 47 U.S.C. § 222, or other applicable law.193
A comparison of the terms of UFADAA and PEAC demonstrates that
the two legislative proposals reside at opposite ends of the privacy spectrum.
UFADAA granted personal representatives access to an account's record and
contents by default.'9 4 PEAC, however, discards default access in its entirety
and requires a court order that makes multiple findings prior to disclosure of
any account information.' Furthermore, even if a personal representative
obtains the necessary court order for disclosure of a record of communica-
tions or account contents under PEAC, a possibility exists that a record or
contents of the account will remain out of reach.'96 PEAC's section two re-
quires a court to quash the order "if compliance with such order otherwise
would cause an undue burden on such provider."'9 7 As a result, the possibility
exists that a court could issue an order for disclosure, an online service pro-
vider could delay complying with the order for a lengthy period of time, and
then the online service provider could file a motion to quash the disclosure
order.'9 8 In theory, the motion to quash could be filed after an estate is closed,
which may require the re-opening of an estate if, for example, a debt is dis-
covered in the online information.'9 9 Compared to UFADAA, PEAC erects
numerous hurdles to overcome for personal representatives eeking access to
any information in a decedent's online accounts; PEAC's default privacy set-
ting is zero.
193 id
194 UFADAA, supra note 44, § 7.
195 See PEAC, supra note 54, § 1.
196 Id at § 2.
197 Id
198 Karin Prangley, War and PEAC in Digital Assets: The Providers' PEAC Act Wages War with
UFADAA, PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 2015, at 40,44 ("[T]he PEAC Act allows a service provider to quash
an order requiring disclosure or to refuse disclosure, even after the necessary court order has been ob-
tained. The PEAC Act does not limit the amount of time that the provider may take to quash the order or
refuse to disclose. At any time after the order has been issued, the provider could simply move to have
the order quashed.").
199 Id. ("The PEAC Act also does not preclude the provider from moving to quash the order, even if




Like UFADAA, PEAC became the subject of critical examination fol-
lowing its introduction to state legislatures.2 0 0 One of the primary critiques of
PEAC is that its mandate requiring separate court orders to access a record
and content, respectively, slows the process of administering an estate.2 0 1 A
California Assembly member, for example, placed a PEAC bill on the legis-
lative agenda in early 2015.202 As part of the normal legislative process, the
state judiciary committee analyzed PEAC and opined that PEAC's mandate
for court-ordered disclosure would "delay the estate administration and re-
quire the expenditure of estate assets in order to comply." 20 3 More specifi-
cally, the committee pointed out that a personal representative is legally re-
quired to file an inventory of the decedent's estate four months after the de-
cedent's death and PEAC's requirements establish "a complex procedure"
that increases the difficulty of meeting the inventory deadline.20 4 Given the
number and complexity of court adjudications, complying with PEAC's pro-
visions risked a "delay distribution of estate assets or payments to heirs or
creditors."205
PEAC not only differed from UFADAA on the core issue of default
access to digital assets, but also in the important category of scorekeeping.2 06
Unlike UFADAA's widespread consideration in state legislatures across the
nation, a mere four states contemplated PEAC bills during their 2015 legis-
lative sessions.20 7 California halted consideration of its PEAC bill during the
last quarter of 2015.208 Oregon has held public hearings on its PEAC bill,
200 For an overview of possible objections to PEAC see id. at 41-44.
201 E.g., CAL. S. JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT ON THE PRIVACY EXPECTATION AFTERLIFE AND
CHOICES ACT, Assemb. B. 691 (Calderon) (July 13, 2015), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB691 (click on "07/13/15- Senate Judiciary").
202 Bill History, Assemb. B. 691, 2015-2016 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB691 (click on "History") [hereinafter Cal. Bill His-
tory].
203 CAL. S. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 201.
204 Id at 18-19.
205 Id. at 19.
206 In addition, PEAC is narrower in scope because it addresses only access/disclosure as it relates
to personal representatives of decedents' estates. UFADAA and RUFADAA comprehend access/disclo-
sure to fiduciaries as a general matter. Compare UFADAA, supra note 44 § 3(a) and RUFADAA, supra
note 58 at § 3(a), with PEAC, supra note 54 § 1(B).
207 See Cal. Bill History, supra note 202; History S.B. 1450, 2015 Sess. (Va. 2015), http://lis.vir-
ginia.gov/151/sum/SB1450.HTM [hereinafter Va. Bill History]; Wyoming Privacy Expectation Afterlife
and Choices Act (Working Draft 16 LSO-0041, Wyo. 2016), http://legisweb.state.
wy.us/interimCommittee/2015/16LSO-0041-0.5.pdf [Wyoming Draft Bill]; Overview, H.B. 2647, 78th
Or. Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015), https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2015R1/Measures/Overview/
HB2647 (click on "Measure History") [hereinafter Oregon Bill Overview].
208 See Cal. Bill History, supra note 202.
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which remains in committee,209 and, unsurprisingly, the ACLU offered testi-
mony in support of passage.210 Similarly, Wyoming's Task For on Digital
Information Privacy is studying PEAC in advance of a possible vote in
2016.211 At present, Virginia is the only state to pass PEAC, which became
part of the Virginia Code in mid-2015.2 12
While NetChoice drafted PEAC, the ULC returned to the drawing board
in acknowledgement of the privacy criticisms aimed at UFADAA, and pro-
duced a revised version of UFADAA (RUFADAA) almost one year later.213
According to a 2015 memorandum from the ULC's annual meeting,
UFADAA's opponents "participated in the drafting process, [but] they did
not articulate or engage in serious discussions about their concerns until re-
cently."214 The ULC asserted that "[tihe proposed amendments, although ex-
tensive in form, will not substantially change the purpose or effect of the
act."2 15 Despite the changes, the ULC intended the revisions to retain the ac-
cess and disclosure authority granted to personal representatives under
UFADAA. 216 In the end, the ULC hoped that the changes would "serve the
essential purposes of the act and substantially decrease opposition to its en-
actment."217
For the purposes of estate administration, the most important provision
under RUFADAA is section eight and its requirements to obtain a catalogue
of communications stored in a decedent's account.218 Section eight of
RUFADAA requires the service provider to transfer a catalogue of the com-
munications stored in the account to the personal representative unless pro-
hibited by the user or a court.219 To trigger disclosure of an account catalogue,
a personal representative must proffer a written request for a catalogue, a
copy of the decedent's death certificate, and letters testamentary to the online
209 Oregon Bill Overview, supra note 206.
210 Hearing on H.B. 2647 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2015 Sess. (Or. 2015) (testimony
of Kimberly McCullough, Legislative Dir., Am. Civ. Liberty Union of Or.), https://olis.leg.state.
or.us/liz/2015R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/53223.
211 Wyoming Draft Bill, supra note 207.
212 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-109 (2015); see also Va. Bill History, supra note 207.
213 RUFADAA, supra note 58. The revised version remains broader than PEAC by covering various
types of fiduciaries in addition to personal representatives of a decedent's estate.
214 Memorandum from the Unif. Law Comm'n (Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.uniformlaws.
org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20As-





218 RUFADAA defines a "catalogue of electronic communications" as "information that identifies
each person with which a user has had an electronic communication, the time and date of the communi-




service provider.2 0 Furthermore, RUFADAA requires a personal representa-
tive to provide the following "if requested by the custodian" of the account:
(A) a number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account
identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the user's account;
(B) evidence linking the account to the user;
(C) an affidavit stating that the disclosure of the user's digital assets is
reasonably necessary for estate administration; or
(D) a finding by the court that:
(i) the user had a specific account with the custodian, identifiable
by the information specified in subparagraph (A); or
(ii) disclosure of the user's digital assets is reasonably necessary
221for estate administration.
For a decedent's survivors interested in acquiring information about a
decedent, RUFADAA's most important provision is section seven and its re-
quirements for disclosure of account contents.222 Section seven permits an
online service provider to disclose the contents of a decedent's account "[i]f
the user consented to disclosure or if a court orders disclosure."2 2 3 In addition
to evidence of a decedent's consent, the personal representative must provide
the custodian with "a written request for disclosure in physical or electronic
form," a copy of a death certificate, a copy of an instrument granting author-
ity to act on behalf of the decedent, and a copy of the account holder's will. 224
Furthermore, the personal representative must, "if requested," provide
(A) a number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account
identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the user's account;
(B) evidence linking the account to the user; or
(C) a finding by the court that:
(i) the user had a specific account with the custodian, identifia-
ble by the information specified in subparagraph (A);
(ii) disclosure of the content of electronic communications of
the user would not violate 18 U.S.C. Section 2701 et seq. [as
amended], 47 U.S.C. Section 222 [as amended], or other appli-
cable law;
(iii) unless the user provided direction using an online tool, the
user consented to disclosure of the content of electronic com-
munications; or
(iv) disclosure of the content of electronoic communications of




222 RUFADAA defines the "content" of an account as "information concerning the substance or
meaning of the communication" that "has been sent or received by a user," is both "in electronic storage,"
and is "not readily accessible to the public." RUFADAA, supra note 58, § 2(6).
223 Id. § 7 cmt.
224 Id. § 7(1)-(4).
225 Id. §7(5).
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The structural and substantive changes from UFADAA to RUFADAA
reflect the effectiveness of the anti-UFADAA campaign. Structurally,
RUFADAA discards UFADAA's single set of requirements for access to all
account information, both record and contents, in favor of PEAC's bifurcated
requirements to access a record of account communications and the contents
of those communications.2 2 6 Substantively, RUFADAA's privacy setting for
an account record is similar to UFADAA's presumption of disclosure. Like
UFADAA, RUFADAA requires an online service provider to deliver a rec-
ord of account communications "unless the user prohibited disclosure of dig-
ital assets or the court directs otherwise."22 7
However, RUFADAA diverges from UFADAA by prohibiting disclo-
sure of contents unless "the user consented to disclosure of the contents of
electronic communications."2 28 Further severing ties to its ancestor,
RUFADAA declares that an online service provider may request a court or-
der prior to disclosure of either a catalogue or contents.2 29 By comparison,
RUFADAA's presumption regarding disclosure of contents is more closely
related to PEAC's presumption of nondisclosure than UFADAA's disclosure
by default without court involvement. Because the revisions were "extensive
in form," RUFADAA is, more or less, an entirely new model act;230 and the
new model act incorporates many of PEAC's privacy benchmarks.
Interestingly, NetChoice endorsed the ULC's revisions in early 2016,
despite RUFADAA's textually permissive approach to the requirement of a
court order for a record or contents of a digital account. According to a mem-
orandum explaining its support, NetChoice described RUFADAA as a "pri-
vacy-centric" model that balanced the needs of fiduciaries and the privacy
interests of account holders/correspondents while complying with federal
law.231 The language used in the memo, however, may foreshadow how
RUFADAA is likely to function-at least from NetChoice's point of view.
According to the memo, "[t]he probate court can order copies of the records
of the communications for the fiduciary."2 32 The terms of RUFADAA, how-
ever, permit an online service provider to provide a catalogue or contents
without a court order; a court order is only required "if requested" by the
service provider.2 3 3 Similarly, NetChoice asserts that RUFADAA permits a
personal representative to access the contents of digital accounts "only when
the deceased expressly allowed it in their will or through user choice controls.
226 Id.
227 RUFADAA, supra note 58, § 8.
228 Id §7.
229 Compare RUFADAA, supra note 58, § 7(5), § 8(4), with UFADAA, supra note 44, § 4.
230 RUFADAA Memo, supra note 214.
231 NetChoice Two-Pager, supra note 62.
232 Id. In fairness, using the word "can" may also be interpreted to mean "may" and therefore reflect
the terms of the model act as written.
233 RUFADAA, supra note 58, § 7(5) and § 8(4).
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... subject to verification and indemnification processes."23 4 The phrase "ver-
ification and indemnification processes" is vague and could refer to the court
orders that an online service provider may request as part of the disclosure
procedure.23 5 NetChoice's PEAC is "privacy-centric" and mandates court in-
volvement;23 6 therefore, the probability that it would embrace RUFADAA's
regulatory strategy if it impaired the interests of its members probably ap-
proaches zero.
Regardless of which third-generation statute is more widely embraced,
the arguments made on the floors of state legislatures reflect those made by
parties seeking judicially compelled post-mortem access to digital assets in
states without positive law on the issue.23 7 Access seekers like John Ellsworth
and the plaintiffs in Ajemian based claims for access in court on the ground
that the contents of the account belonged to deceased account users.2 3 8 Parties
opposing access in court asserted that denying access protected the privacy
interests of those who communicated with the decedent.2 3 9 On the legislative
front, the Prefatory Note to UFADAA declares that it "promotes the fiduci-
ary's ability to administer the account holder's property."240 On the other
hand, UFADAA's opponents decried the grant of access by default under its
provisions and laud the privacy protections offered by PEAC and
RUFADAA. 2 4' In effect, the tug-of-war over post-mortem access to digital
assets has shifted from the courtroom to the legislature and the winner is yet
to be determined.
II. ISOLATING POSTHUMOUS PRIVACY
Proponents and opponents of post-mortem access legislation generally
agree about one basic principle-digital assets are property. The fiduciary
friendly provisions of the now superseded UFADAA stated that one of its
goals was to facilitate a personal representative's "ability to administer the
account holder's property."24 2 While generally opposed to unfettered post-
mortem access, Google's terms of service declare that users "retain owner-
ship of any intellectual property rights" in account content and, more simply
234 See NetChoice Two-Pager, supra note 62.
235 Compare id., with RUFADAA, supra note 58, §§ 7(5), 8(4).
236 See generally PEAC, supra note 54.
237 See supra notes 194-199 and accompanying text (explaining that UFADAA and PEAC are on
opposite sides of the privacy spectrum).
238 See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013); Abrams supra note 114.
239 See Abrams supra note 114 (discussing Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d 604).
240 UFADAA, supra note 44, at 2 (Prefatory Note). The online version of RUFADAA does not have
a Prefatory Note.
241 See supra note 47-62 and accompanying text.
242 UFADAA, supra note 44 at 2 (Prefatory Note). Presumably, RUFADAA would serve the same
purpose even though it does not have a Prefatory Note.
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put, "what belongs to you stays yours."243 Such statements in an online ser-
vice provider's terms of service make it difficult to argue that the contents of
an online account are not 'property'. Beyond legislators and lobbyists, the
view that digital information is property of one sort or another predominates.
The Internal Revenue Service even treats "virtual currency" as property for
federal tax purposes; therefore, Bitcoin is subject to taxation.2 44 Given the
overwhelming view that digital assets are property, groups seeking to draft a
rule to govern post-mortem access to digital assets do not press the argument
that digital assets somehow fall outside the definition of "property."2 4 5
The general agreement about the status of digital assets as property,
however, leaves room for debate about the privacy rights associated with a
decedent's digital assets. For some, the issue of privacy does not present
much of an obstacle to accessing information stored in a password-protected
account. An article in an American Bar Association journal, Probate & Prop-
erty, argued that "[t]his is not a privacy issue" because the protection offered
by existing fiduciary law would impose liability if the fiduciary "went rogue
with on-line access" or "broadcast the information to the world." 246 Accord-
ing to others, privacy advocates overlook the interests of families who might
lose "all proof of existence of the decedent" or their existence "without some
type of access" so "[g]aining a copy of all transmissions may not go far
enough."24 7 In short, the importance of fiduciary effectiveness coupled with
243 Google Terms ofService, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last modified
Apr. 14, 2014). See also Statement ofRights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, supra note 106.
244 I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, I.R.B. 2014-16 (Apr. 14, 2014). Furthermore, some jurisdictions recog-
nize a claim for conversion of digital assets, which represents an acknowledgment hat digital assets are
"property." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965) (noting that conversion requires in-
terference with "the right of another to control ... the chattel."). For cases that recognize a claim for
conversion of digital assets, see, e.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003); Thyroff v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1273 (N.Y. 2007). For more on New York's perspective, see
David P. Miranda, Doctrine of Conversion Applies to Electronic Property, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS'N J., Feb.
2008, at 47. Massachusetts, on the other hand, does not recognize conversion of digital assets, see In re
TJX Companies Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 209, 212-13 (D. Mass. 2007), aff'd in part,
564 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 2009). For general discussion on conversion of digital assets, see Caitlin J. Akins,
Conversion ofDigital Property: Protecting Consumers in the Age ofTechnology, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REv. 215 (2010).
245 In addition, the failure to argue against property rights in account content avoids the thorny issue
associated with intellectual property rights in the content of a digital account. For an example of the com-
plications associated with labeling the content of an email account as "property," see Jonathan J. Darrow
and Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a Decedent's Emails: Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the
Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 281 (2006).
246 Victoria Blachly, Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act: What UFADAA Know, 29
PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 2015, at 8, 19. See also Benjamin Orzeske, UFADAA and Privacy, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20
Assets/UFADAA%20and%2OPrivacy.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2016) (observing that fiduciaries have a
duty to "keep private information private, or face liability under our privacy laws.").
247 Rash Letter, supra note 43.
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the interest of survivors to the information in an account can make privacy a
non-factor in the access calculus.
Conversely, drafters of RUFADAA and PEAC considered an account
holder's interest in privacy during the process of crafting each model statute.
The weight assigned to an account holder's privacy, however, is subject to
interpretation. The ULC asserted that "[t]he general goal of the act is to fa-
cilitate fiduciary access while respecting the privacy and intent of the account
holder,"24 8 but then provided personal representatives access to the contents
of an online account by default under the terms of UFADAA. 249 Additionally,
even though the ULC responded to the privacy criticisms in RUFADAA, the
order in which the ULC promulgated its model legislation reflects, in all like-
lihood, the importance of a deceased account holder's privacy to the drafters.
UFADAA granted access by default and then RUFADAA offered greater
privacy protection for a decedent's digital assets in response to muscular op-
position.250 Under those chronological circumstances, the legislative U-turn
does not seem to be driven by a new found commitment to a decedent's right
of privacy within the single year separating UFADAA and RUFADAA. In-
stead, the move from default access to privacy protection appears to be a
reaction to a legislative wallop; a display of legislative pragmatism. The ULC
cannot be faulted for its pragmatic approach to passing model legislation, but
it also cannot claim an unwavering interest in protecting the privacy of dece-
dents' digital information.
Similarly, the arguments of opponents do not evince any great solici-
tousness for the decedent's privacy interest in account information. PEAC's
drafters criticized UFADAA because it "disregard[ed] the privacy interests
of third parties and decedents by essentially creating a 'show me everything'
rule for whoever becomes a fiduciary."2 5 1 A decedent's interest in privacy,
however, is an afterthought compared to the privacy interests of survivors.
For example, a Center for Democracy and Technology blog post asserted that
UFADAA "raise[d] concerns for third parties who might have communicated
with the deceased" because they "may have sent vulnerable or sensitive in-
formation to the deceased" without regard to any privacy interest of a dece-
dent.2 5 2 The State Privacy and Security Coalition prioritized the relevant in-
terests in its objection to Connecticut's UFADAA-based bill on the ground
248 UFADAA, supra note 44, at 2 (Prefatory Note).
249 id
250 See supra notes 226-231 and accompanying text (discussing the changes that the ULC made to
UFADAA in response to the strong campaign against it).
251 Privacy Afterlife, NETCHOICE, https://netchoice.org/library/decedent-information/ (last visited
Aug. 13, 2016).
252 Alethea Lange, Everybody Dies: What is Your Digital Legacy?, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.
(Jan. 23, 2015), https://cdt.org/blogleverybody-dies-what-is-your-digital-legacy/.
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that it had a "complete disregard for the privacy of other persons who com-
municated with the decedent, as well as the privacy of the decedent."253 A
decedent's privacy interest is not entirely ignored, but it is secondary to the
privacy of surviving correspondents.
Casting further doubt on their commitment o post-mortem account pri-
vacy, and perhaps privacy as a general matter, UFADAA's service provider
opponents intrude upon the privacy of accounts during the lives of their ac-
count holders. When Yahoo! implemented a new email system in late 2012,
the interface allowed Yahoo! to scan incoming email messages for infor-
mation that could be used by advertisers to target ads aimed at the account
holder.254 The account holder may not have read the incoming email, but Ya-
hoo!'s software had scoured it for information that might be useful to third
parties.255 And Yahoo! is not alone in such a practice-Google's email soft-
ware has employed the same scanning technique.256 In fact, Google's soft-
ware also (allegedly) sent spain to users that had the appearance of emails, a
practice derisively denominated as getting "Scroogled."257 Humorously, the
anti-Google campaign went so far as to have hats, shirts, and mugs embla-
zoned with "Scroogled," a "Scroogled" website, and a Twitter handle.258
Moreover, the hunting and gathering of information has expanded as instant
messages are also probed for possible violations of copyright law.259 Regard-
less of the platform of communication, one privacy analyst observed that "i 's
the norm that when these companies review their privacy policies that they
strip away people's rights rather than protecting them."260 If user privacy is
discounted during that user's life, then service provider assertions that they
seek to protect a deceased account holder's privacy are, to say the least, du-
bious.
253 Letter from James J. Halpert, Gen. Counsel, State Privacy and Sec. Coal., Inc., to Senator Eric
Coleman and Representative William Tong (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/JUD
data/Tmy/2015SB-00979-R000306-Halpert,%2OJames%20J.%20-%2oState%20Privacy%20and
%20Security%2OCoalition,%201nc.-TMY.PDF.
254 John P. Mello, Jr., Yahoo Mail Redesign Becomes Permanent, Privacy Issues Surface,
PCWORLD, (June 3, 2013), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2040642/yahoo-mail-redesign-becomes-per-
manent-privacy-issues-surface.html.
255 Id. ("When you choose to use Yahoo's revamped interface, you also agree (unless you opt out)
to let the service scan email arriving in your inbox for, among other things, information that can be used
to target advertising to you.").
256 Id.
257 Mary Jo Foley, Microsoft Readies aNew ScroogledAttack on "Gspam", ZDNET (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoft-readies-a-new-scroogled-attack-on-gspam/.
258 Mary Jo Foley, Did Microsoft Just Kill its Anti-Google "Scroogled" Campaign?, ZDNET, (Apr.
14, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/article/did-microsoft-just-kill-its-anti-google-scroogled-campaign/
(noting that a Gmail user could avoid getting "Scroogled" by adjusting the settings on the account).




Whether omitting privacy as a factor in its entirety or expressing support
for the protection of posthumous privacy that rings hollow, the debate re-
garding post-mortem access to a decedent's online accounts largely ignores
the interest of the one party who is indispensable to the issue: the decedent.2 6 1
More specifically, arguments mustered to justify privacy positions generally,
though not entirely, disregard whether or not an individual intended to have
the contents of online accounts remain private after death. From the perspec-
tive of the law of wills, the absence of meaningful consideration of a dece-
dent's intent is striking because much of the law of wills is founded on that
intent.26 2 The Uniform Probate Code, which contains provisions governing
both intestate and testate estates, declares that one of its purposes is "to dis-
cover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his prop-
erty."263 Whether labeled as "probable intent" for purposes of distributing
property for individuals who die without a will or "construed intent" when
interpreting a will, the intent of the decedent is nonetheless the foremost goal
when distributing an individual's property after death.2 6 4
While undervaluing an individual's intent in a probate setting runs
counter to probate law's focus on decedent intent, the low regard for decedent
privacy is in accord with privacy's boundary at common law. Historically, a
deceased individual does not have a common law right to privacy because
the right of privacy is vindicated by a legal action that is personal to the
holder; therefore, the legal right vanishes at the death of the holder.2 65 As a
result, the estate of a deceased individual is also barred from filing suit for an
invasion of a decedent's privacy.2 66 Similarly, surviving relatives are also
prohibited from seeking redress for an invasion of a decedent's privacy; there
261 The word "largely" is used because NetChoice did not entirely ignore a decedent's intent, see
Privacy Afterlife, supra note 251 (arguing that PEAC honors citizens' explicit and implied privacy choices
regarding their privacy afterlife).
262 The phrase "much of the law of wills" is used because at least one aspect of the law of wills does
not account for the intent of the decedent. Upon marriage, one spouse obtains an elective share of the
other spouse's estate at death regardless of how much the decedent spouse wished to disinherit the sur-
viving spouse. In that way, the law of wills ignores the intent of the decedent spouse in favor of a surviving
spouse. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 2010).
263 Id § 1-102(b)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2013).
264 See id §2 (Prefatory Note).
265 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 6521 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). See also Metter v. L.A.
Exam'r, 95 P.2d 491, 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939) (describing a lawsuit based upon a violation of privacy as
"a purely personal action [that] does not survive, but dies with the person."); Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait
Studio, 128 N.Y.S. 247, 249 (N. Y. 1911) ("The peculiarly personal character of the cause of action cre-
ated by the statute negatives the idea that the Legislature intended that it should be enforceable by the
personal representatives of the person in whose favor the cause of action existed. The injury done by the
violation of the right does not affect the estate of the person injured, but is strictly an injury to the person
of the plaintiff."); Laura Hunter Dietz, 20 MICH. CIV. JUR. PRIVACY § 3 (2015) at 188 (describing the
common law right of privacy).
266 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 6521 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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is no relational right of privacy.2 6 7 Given the firmly entrenched view that a
decedent has no cause of action for an invasion of privacy, minimizing the
decedent's privacy interest in crafting the UFADAA, RUFADAA, and
PEAC mirrors the traditional understanding of the right of privacy. The leg-
islatively prudent approach is to eschew a decedent's interest and focus on
the privacy interests of surviving correspondents because their interests re-
main protected in both the policies of providers as well as common law, and
they can file suit seeking a remedy for a violation.
The historical enforcement barrier to protecting a decedent's informa-
tional privacy, however, has not proven to be insurmountable. As evidence
of the permeability of the death barrier, Congress has enacted federal laws
that protect posthumous privacy as an offshoot of the privacy protection af-
forded to those who survive the decedent, and may suffer harm due to the
release of information about the decedent. The Health Information and Pri-
vacy Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA), for example, includes a Privacy
Rule that seeks to balance "important uses of information" with "the privacy
of people who seek care and healing."2 6 8 While many of HIPAA's regulations
are aimed at the living, HIPAA's disclosure restrictions extend protection to
medical information associated with deceased persons.2 6 9 More specifically,
a "covered entity" must keep an individual's health information private for
fifty years after the individual's death.2 7 0 The fifty-year moratorium balances
"the privacy interests of living relatives or other affected individuals with a
relationship to the decedent, with the difficulty of obtaining authorizations
from personal representatives as time passes."2 7 1 Although the protection is
premised on the privacy interests of surviving individuals, a decedent's pri-
vate medical information is nevertheless generally prohibited from being dis-
closed.2 7 2 Prohibiting informational disclosure based upon the interests of
267 See, e.g., Fitch v. Voit, 624 So. 2d 542, 543 (Ala. 1993) ("[T]he right of privacy is a personal
right, and that this Court has not recognized a 'relational right of privacy,' under which the plaintiffs make
their claim."); West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 648 (Tenn. 2001) ("[Tlhe right to
privacy is a personal right. . . . [it] may not be . . . asserted by a member of the individual's family, even
if brought after the death of the individual."). For general and historical information about the absence of
a relational right of privacy, see Ronald F. Fisk, Why Not a Relational Right of Privacy?-or Right of
Property?, 42 UMKC L. REV. 175, 175-76, 181-82 (1973).
268 Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP'T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., (last visited Aug.
13, 2016), http://www.hhs.gov/hipaalfor-professionals/privacy/index.html.
269 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g) (2015).
270 Id. § 160.103 (excluding information "[r]egarding a person who has been deceased for more than
50 years" from the definition of "[p]rotected health information"); id. § 164.512(f) ("A covered entity
must comply with the requirements of this subpart with respect to the protected health information of a
deceased individual for a period of 50 years following the death of the individual.").
271 Modification to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules, 78
Fed. Reg. 5,566, 5,614 (2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2015)). A chief concern that motivated
the 50-year period was that archivists and other interested persons had trouble locating a personal repre-
sentative to authorize discloser of protected health information as time passed. Id.
272 Id.
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survivors yields the same result as basing nondisclosure upon a decedent's
interest-nondisclosure.
Despite the general fifty-year ban on disclosure, the Code of Federal
Regulations declares that a "covered entity" must treat a personal representa-
tive of a decedent's estate like the individual for purposes of HIPAA's pri-
vacy protections.2 7 3 Upon first blush, equating the access of a personal repre-
sentative with that of the individual seems to permit a personal representative
to go on a foraging expedition for a decedent's health information. The ac-
cess granted to personal representatives by HIPAA, however, is not limitless.
For example, an individual cannot obtain psychotherapy notes and "[i]nfor-
mation compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or for use in, a civil, criminal,
or administrative action or proceeding."2 7 4 More broadly, the Code of Federal
Regulations qualifies that a personal representative is treated as the individ-
ual "with respect to protected health information relevant to such personal
representation."27 5 And, HIPPA "does not override or interfere with State or
other laws that provide greater protection" for "sensitive" medical infor-
273 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(1) (2015).
274 Id § 164.524(a)(1)(i) (2015). See also, e.g., HIPPA Privacy Policy, FLOYD MEMORIAL HOSP.,
(June 26, 2014) http://floydmemorial.com/hipaal ("You have the right to inspect and obtain a copy of the
PHI that may be used to make decisions about you, including patient medical records and billing records,
but not including psychotherapy notes. . . . You have the right to request an 'accounting of disclosures.'
An 'accounting of disclosures' is a list of certain non-routine disclosures we have made of your PHI. This
list will not include uses you have already authorized, or those for treatment payment or operations. This
list will not include psychotherapy notes, or uses made for national security purposes, or, to corrections
or law enforcement personnel."); HIPPA, Minnesota's Health Records Act, and Psychotherapy Notes,
MINN. DEP'T. HEALTH (Oct. 2014), http://www.health.state.mn.us/e-health/
privacy/psl02114psychotherapy.pdf ("Under HIPAA's Privacy Rule, a mental health professional is not
required to disclose psychotherapy notes to a patient. In fact, psychotherapy notes are specifically ex-
cluded from a patient's general right to access or inspect their own medical records If a mental health
professional ever wishes to disclose the psychotherapy notes, however, they are permitted to do so, but
must first receive the patient's authorization."); Confidentiality of Psychotherapy and Personal Notes,
COLUM. U. MED. CTR. (Dec. 2009), http://www.cumc.columbia.edu/hipaalpdf/PsychotherapyNotes
Policy.pdf ("Psychotherapy and personal notes are considered the property of the health care provider
who created them, and will not be released or disclosed to patients.").
275 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(4) (2015) ("If under applicable law an executor, administrator, or other
person has authority to act on behalf of a deceased individual or of the individual's estate, a covered entity
must treat such person as a personal representative under this subchapter, with respect to protected health
information relevant to such personal representation."). See also, e.g., HIPAA For Professionals, FAQ,
1503-Does HIPAA Permit a Covered Entity to Disclose PHIAbout a Decedent to Family Members, U.S.
DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/1503/does-hipaa-per-
mit-a-covered-entity-to-disclose-information-about-a-decedent/index.html (last accessed Aug. 14, 2016).
For more information about HIPAA and the privacy of decedents, see Jacqueline Myles Crain, HIPAA-
A Shield For Health Information and a Snag for Estate Planning and Corporate Documents, 40 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 357, 366 (2005); Leslie P. Francis, Skeletons in the Family Medical Closet: Access
of Personal Representatives to Interoperable Medical Records, 4 ST. LOUIs U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
371, 378-80 (2011).
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mation related to "HIV/AIDS, substance abuse, or mental health infor-
mation."2 76 As a result, "[c]overed entities may continue to provide privacy
protections to decedent information."27 7 During the course of estate admin-
istration, the personal representative might need access to health records to
identify debts accruing from medical services, but not information unneces-
sary to settle the estate.
Like HIPPA's asymptotic recognition of posthumous privacy, the Free-
dom of Information Act of 1996 (FOIA) also permits a decedent's infor-
mation to remain private by indirect means.2 78 In response to a breakdown of
the information flowing to the public under the Administrative Procedure
Act,279 FOIA's section 552(a)(3)(A) mandates that agencies furnish copies of
records to citizens who make requests that "reasonably describe" the desired
record as well as comply with any published rules that govern the submission
of requests.280 Furthermore, federal agencies are directed to employ a "pre-
sumption of openness when responding to a FOIA request."281 Notably, a re-
questing person need not identify a reason for the request,28 2 which presuma-
bly makes it easier to submit a request. To that end, the number of requests
made to specific federal agencies is directly proportional to the political con-
troversy associated with the regulatory ambit of the federal agency. The
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services received 143,794 re-
quests during the 2014 fiscal year while the Office of Operations Coordina-
tion fielded a mere 59 requests during the same period.2 8 3 Despite the volume
of requests and the time consumed to respond, each branch of the federal
government lauds FOIA "as a vital part of our democracy."284 As evidence of
the importance of citizens' access to information, every state has enacted a
version of FOIA to provide citizens with access to state records.28 5
While FOIA creates a blanket mandate favoring disclosure, two exemp-
tions serve as buffers against disclosure thereby protecting personal privacy.
Exemption six shields data in "personnel and medical files and similar files"
from disclosure when revealing the information "would constitute a clearly
276 78 Fed. Reg. 5,566, 5,614 (2013).
277 Id.
278 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
279 See H.R. REP. No. 1497-89, pt. 3, at 25, 27 (1966) (concluding that the APA had become "au-
thority for withholding, rather than disclosing information" and "improper denials" occurred repeatedly).
280 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012).
281 U.S. Dep't. of Justice, FOIA.Gov, http://www.foia.gov/about.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2016).
282 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771
(1989).
283 U.S. Dep't. of Justice, FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov/data.html#foiaReportsTable (last visited
Aug. 10, 2016).
284 U.S. Dep't. of Justice, FOIA.Gov, http://www.foia.gov/about.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2016).
285 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002) ("Today, all fifty states have open records statutes, a majority of which
are modeled after the FOIA.").
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unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."2 8 6 In a similar vein, exemption
seven prohibits the acquisition of personal information to be used for "law
enforcement purposes" when disclosure "could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."2 8 7 Applying either
exemption requires a court to balance the individual's interest in personal
privacy with the public's interest in disclosure.2 8 8 Furthermore, a "presump-
tion" in favor of disclosure is deployed when applying exemption six and the
language of exemption seven limits its application to purposes involving
"law enforcement."28 9 In short, the scales used by courts to weigh privacy
versus disclosure tilt heavily in favor of disclosure under the FOIA.
Given FOIA's inter vivos protection of personal privacy under its ex-
emptions, a question arises regarding whether or not the protection of indi-
vidual privacy survives death under the exemptions. The Department of Jus-
tice clarified the applicability of the exemptions to the privacy of decedents
in a 1982 update.29 0 Because privacy rights end at death, according to the
update, the exemptions do not "directly" apply to protect a decedent's pri-
vacy.291 However, "careful consideration should be given to whether such
protection can be extended to others."29 2 To that end, the Department of Jus-
tice observed that
[W]hile privacy rights cannot be inherited by one's heirs, the disclosure of particu-
larly sensitive personal information pertaining to a deceased person may well
threaten the privacy interests of surviving family members or other close associ-
ates.2 93
Although it may be derived from the privacy rights of survivors, a de-
cedent's privacy regarding some information is retained after death; indirect
protection is again nonetheless protection. Simply put, "Congress intended
286 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6) (2012).
287 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(C) (2012).
288 U.S. Dep't. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989) ("Ex-
emption 7(C) requires us to balance the privacy interest in maintaining, as the Government puts it, the
'practical obscurity' of the rap sheets against the public interest in their release."); Multi Ag Media LLC
v. Dep't. of Agric., 515 F.3d 1224, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("The balancing analysis for FOIA Exemption
6 requires that we first determine whether disclosure of the files 'would compromise a substantial, as
opposed to de minimis, privacy interest,' because 'if no significant privacy interest is implicated FOIA . .
. demands disclosure."') (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 874 (D.C.
Cir. 1989)).
289 Law. Comm. for Civil Rights of S.F. Bay Area v. U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury, No. C 07-2590
PJH, 2008 WL 4482855, at *19-21 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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that the privacy interest protected under FOIA extend beyond the common
law."1294
The Department of Justice's admonition to weigh the impact of disclo-
sure on a decedent's survivors is not without effect on judicial decision-mak-
ing. To the contrary, courts frequently consider the consequences of public
knowledge of the protected information and opt to protect the privacy rights
of survivors, which, in turn, protects the privacy of decedents. A federal
court, for example, determined that Exemption 7(C) shielded Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King Jr.'s survivors from the ramifications of disclosing "information of
a personal nature, the disclosure of which allegedly could embarrass Dr.
King's family and associates or damage their reputations."2 9 5 Similarly, a fed-
eral court found that Exemption 6 prohibited the release of x-rays and pho-
tographs associated with President Kennedy's autopsy to prevent the "an-
guish" that may be inflicted upon the surviving Kennedys following disclo-
sure.2 96 Of course, an individual need not be a public figure to benefit from
FOIA's exemptions and not all cases result in withholding information from
the public.2 97 Regardless of the deceased individual's notoriety, a court bal-
ances the "public's broad right to information guaranteed under FOIA against
the privacy rights which Congress intended to protect" when applying
FOIA's exemptions.2
As a theoretical matter, HIPPA and FOIA's strategy of protecting a de-
cedent's information as a tangent to protecting a survivor's privacy interest
could protect a decedent's interest in the privacy of the contents of digital
accounts after death. Arguably, accounting for a decedent's interest in pri-
vacy during the legislative process is unnecessary because a deceased ac-
count holder's privacy interest is sufficiently vindicated by the legal remedy
afforded surviving correspondents. Section 2707(a) of the SCA states that
any "person aggrieved by any violation of this chapter . .. may, in a civil
action, recover from the person or entity, other than the United States, which
engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate."29 9 As a result,
surviving senders of communications that remain in an online account after
the death of an account holder could file suit to enforce their interests in the
privacy of their communications. Like the protective schemes of HIPPA and
294 Marzen v. Dep't. of Health & Hum. Servs., 825 F.2d 1148, 1152 (7th Cir. 1987).
295 Lesar v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (construing Exemption 7(c)).
296 Katz v. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., 862 F. Supp. 476, 483-86 (D.D.C. 1994).
297 See Marzen, 825 F.2d at 1153-54 (barring the release of an infant's medical records under 7(c));
Outlaw v. U.S. Dep't. of Army, 815 F. Supp. 505, 506 (D.D.C. 1993) (ruling that the potential harm from
release was outweighed by the public interest in disclosure as a check on the administration of justice).
For a collection of cases where a court weighs the public interest in disclosure against the privacy interest
of survivors, see U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: EXEMPTION 6
14 n.54 (last updated Jan. 10, 2014), https://www justice.gov/sites/default/
files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/exemption6.pdf.
298 Marzen, 825 F.2d at 1154.
299 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (2012).
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FOIA, shielding a decedent's account from any disclosure could be a byprod-
uct of the primary protection afforded surviving individuals who have infor-
mation stored in the decedent's account.
Relying on survivors to protect the privacy of their messages in a dece-
dent's online account, however, falls short of providing full protection for the
information remaining in a decedent's online account. An individual corre-
spondent could file suit seeking to enforce the protection offered by the SCA,
but the correspondent could only protect information in which the corre-
spondent has an interest. Obviously, digital accounts that serve as platforms
of communication typically store information sent from a large number of
parties. Because a decedent's intent regarding privacy may be unknown, pro-
tecting the entirety of the information that a decedent intended to keep private
would require the collective action of all correspondents to seek and receive
"relief as may be appropriate."' Some correspondents, of course, will not
file suit for any number of reasons, even though the decedent may have
wanted the information to remain private. In reality, protecting a decedent's
account information as a corollary to the protection granted to information in
the decedent's account connected to living persons is impractical.
One reason that a surviving correspondent may fail to protect her inter-
est in the information stored in a decedent's account is straightforward-in-
dividuals who communicated with the account holder may have no idea that
the account holder is, in fact, dead. Indeed, information associated with a
deceased user may appear in a living person's interface, which gives the false
impression that the deceased user is alive.3 0 ' As a consequence, a living cor-
respondent may send innocuous birthday greetings or innermost thoughts
without knowing that the recipient of the information has died.30 2 If a corre-
spondent does not know that an account holder is deceased, then the corre-
spondent has no reason to seek protection for information in the decedent's
account, particularly within any given limitations period. The informational
asymmetry regarding the status of the account holder undermines the ride-
along protective strategy to post-mortem access/disclosure of digital assets.
In addition to collective action and informational problems, the infor-
mation disclosed to a personal representative or survivors could be inter-
preted differently than was intended by a decedent. Disclosure of the contents
of digital accounts risks misinterpretation because digital information "can
be emotionally impoverished when it comes to nonverbal messages that add
300 Id. § 2707(b)(1) (2012)
301 Jaweed Kaleem, Death on Facebook Now Common As 'Dead Profiles' Create Vast Virtual Cem-
etery, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/07/death-facebook-
dead-profilesn_2245397.html (recounting that birthday wishes that were posted for a deceased individ-
nal); Buck, supra note 107 (observing that "[m]any profiles continue to surface in Sponsored Stories,
which promotes users' activity and likes from months and years past" even though user may be deceased).
302 Kaleem, supra note 301.
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nuance and valence to our words."303 In other words, digital information does
not permit the receiver of the digital data to use her "social radar" to decipher
the sender's intent.304 In fact, a study of the use of email among co-workers
found that "[e]mail characteristics make miscommunication likely," recipi-
ents of emails "misinterpret work emails as more emotionally negative or
neutral than intended," and the use of email as a primary means of commu-
nication increases the likelihood of conflict.30 The closeness of the relation-
ship between the correspondents may reduce the risk of misinterpretation,306
but the risk is ever-present. Disclosing the contents of a decedent's digital
accounts provides the raw data, but cannot convey the situational context in
which that data was created; therefore, the true intent of a deceased corre-
spondent may be irretrievably lost.
A recent example illustrates the contextual nature of digital communi-
cations and the potential risks of post-mortem disclosure of the content of
digital accounts. Sony Pictures Entertainment experienced a "brazen cyber-
attack," that resulted in the public release of the content of numerous emails
stored on Sony's system."0 While some of the emails contained information
protected by HIPAA, 308 other messages contained information that the
sender/recipient would likely want to remain private even though the content
was not protected by federal or state law.309 Messages that labeled popular
Hollywood figures in less than glowing terms or contained racially insensi-
tive remarks were intended for the recipient's eyes alone.310 The release of
the content of the messages to the public prompted one of the sender/recipi-
ents to comment that the emails were "not an accurate reflection" of the




305 Kristin Byron, Carrying Too Heavy a Load? The Communication and Miscommunication of
Emotion by Email, 33 ACAD. OF MGMT. REv. 309, 309 (2008).
306 See Goleman, supra note 303.
307 Letter from Sony Pictures to Current and Former Sony Pictures Employees and Dependents, and
Production Employees (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.sonypictures.com/corp/notification/SPE
CyberNotification.pdf.
308 Id.
309 See Amanda Hess, Inside the Sony Hack, SLATE (Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.slate.com/arti-
cles/technology/users/2015/1 1/sonyemployees onthe hack oneyearlater.html; Eugene Volokh,





310 See Alex Steadman, Leaked Sony Emails Reveal Nasty Exchanges and Insults, VARIETY (Dec. 9,
2014), http://variety.com/2014/film/news/leaked-sony-emails-reveal-nasty-exchanges-and-insults-
1201375511/ (detailing various insults directed at Hollywood figures).
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sender and "written in haste without much thought or sensitivity."3 " Despite
the effort at damage control, the unintended publication of the content trig-
gered an "unraveling of relationships in Hollywood" and "disrupted the web
of executive, business and talent relationships that stitches together Sony's
core moviemaking operation."3 12
Whatever the Sony correspondents meant by the language in their
emails, they had an opportunity to explain any misunderstanding that accom-
panied disclosure. A decedent, by contrast, has no chance to attempt to con-
trol the damage by explaining what was intended by the information or the
context in which it was created. And although the damage threatened by dis-
closing content during estate administration may not have the potential for
financial repercussions like gossipy Hollywood emails, disclosed infor-
mation could be just as personally damaging for survivors. Learning about a
decedent's view of a relationship with a survivor that differs from the survi-
vor's expectation and recollection, or offhand comments made in jest but
misinterpreted, threaten the types of emotional and mental harm compre-
hended by both HIPPA and FOIA.1 The damage is immune from explana-
tion by a decedent once the subject of a private communication learns the
content of the communication.
Each of the foregoing problems-collective action, misinterpretation,
and possible harm from disclosure-unavoidably affects the issue of post-
mortem access and disclosure of a record or contents of digital assets due to
the nature of digital communication. Digital assets used for the purpose of
311 Christopher Rosen, Scott Rudin and Amy Pascal After Racially Insensitive Emails About Obama
Leak, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/1 /scott-rudin-amy-
pascal-apology_n_6310040.html.
312 Michael Ceiply & Brooks Barnes, Sony Hacking Fallout Includes Unraveling ofRelationships in
Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/business/media/sony-at-
tack-is-unraveling-relationships-in-hollywood.html?_r-0 (detailing the impact of the hacking and release
on the personal and professional relationships).
313 The tragic case of Tyler Clementi, a college student who committed suicide after his roommate
"electronically spied" on an intimate encounter with a webcam, provides an example of the possible harm
associated with posthumous discovery of information, albeit in a non-probate context. Prior to his death,
Tyler wrote that his mother had "rejected him" after learning he was gay. Although the information about
Tyler's mother emerged in conjunction with a criminal investigation, it is not difficult to imagine that the
information caused some degree of emotional harm to Tyler's mother. In fact, Tyler's mother has re-
viewed her interactions with her son in an effort to understand his digital comments. And for his part,
though one can never know for certain, Tyler is not likely to have wanted his mother to learn his intimate
thoughts on her reaction to their discussion - at least by way of an online post. Indeed, Tyler offered his
view of his mother's feelings in a digital platform presumably outside the ready access of his mother. In
other words, Tyler commented in private, but now those comments have become known by the subject of
the comments. See Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide, NEW YORKER MAG. (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/02/06/the-story-of-a-suicide (indicating that the information
regarding the mother's reaction may have been included in a "post"); Kashmir Hill, The Post-Mortem
Privacy Invasion of Tyler Clementi, YAHOO NEWS (Aug. 15, 2011), https://www.yahoo.com/news/post-
mortem-privacy-invasion-tyler-clementi-160116484.html?ref-gs (stating that "private chats revealing his
mother's rejection of his sexuality and racist statements about his roommate are now being exposed" and
describing the feelings of Tyler's mother after learning Tyler was gay).
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communication are co-constructed. Facebook accounts, instant messaging
interfaces, and email accounts contain information in the form of sent mes-
sages from account holders as well as messages received from correspond-
ents that remain in the account by default. As a result, an individual's account
not only stores information generated by the account holder, but also content
generated by another individual. If the privacy of those communications is
not preserved at death, some people may suffer unintended harm. Moreover,
information that a decedent freely offered to one party may not have been
intended for any other party; privacy is contextual. The critical contextual
factor for purposes of property distribution at death is decedent intent regard-
ing digital assets. Given the enforcement problems, the only way to protect a
decedent's intent regarding the privacy of digital accounts and prevent unin-
tended harm may be to build a firewall that surrounds an individual's ac-
counts after death. At the very least, an individual's independent interest in
posthumous privacy should factor into the construction of the legal frame-
work for access to post-mortem access to digital assets.
III. POSTHUMOUS PRIVACY AND RECALIBRATING DIGITAL ASSET
LEGISLATION
Isolating a decedent's independent and surviving interest in privacy
does not automatically activate post-mortem protection from disclosure dur-
ing estate administration. Instead, the privacy setting must be calibrated in
accordance with the primary functions that undergird both intestate and tes-
tate succession. Whether property is to be distributed by intestate statute or
by will, the basic interpretive function of the law of wills is to effectuate a
decedent's intent regarding the distribution of her property.314 Other goals
may exist, such as promoting family harmony via intestate distribution,"' but
giving effect to a decedent's intent is generally accepted as the core principle
of the law of wills.
314 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §1-102(b)(2) (amended 2010).
315 See, e.g., Mary L. Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16
LAW & INEQ. 1, 8 (1998) ("At the same time that intestacy statutes reflect social norms and values, they
also shape the norms and values by recognizing and legitimating relationships."); E. Gary Spitko, The




A. Intestacy and Default Intent
According to statistics, most people die intestate;3 16 therefore, a state's
statute of descent and distribution governs the allocation of a vast amount of
probate property. As a general matter, intestacy statutes identify the individ-
uals entitled to share in a decedent's estate, the order in which they take their
shares, and the amount each individual shares."' Although described as a
"theoretical grab bag" by scholars,3 18 courts generally agree that a fundamen-
tal goal of intestate statutes is to distribute a decedent's property in a manner
that comports with how a decedent would have distributed her property if the
decedent had executed a valid will.3 1 9 Because an intestate's actual intent can-
not be known, intestate statutes allocate property without regard to a dece-
dent's specific intent. 320 As a result, the possibility of a mismatch between an
individual's specific and likely intent has served as the basis for robust criti-
cism of intestate statutes.32 1 Nevertheless, courts routinely opine that the pur-
pose of statutes of descent and distribution is to allocate property pursuant to
a decedent's probable intent.
The challenge of discerning an account holder's probable intent regard-
ing post-mortem access is heightened by the terms of service agreements that
316 See Richard Eisenberg, Americans'Ostrich Approach to Estate Planning, FORBES (Apr. 9,2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2014/04/09/americans-ostrich-approach-to-estate-plan
ning/#4ca8cc ldf07b.
317 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 (amended 2010).
318 Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73
FoRDHAM L. REv. 1031, 1036 (2004); See also Mary L. Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property
Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J.
321-22, 323-24.
319 See, e.g., In re Estate of Griswold, 24 P.3d 1191, 1195 (Cal. 2001) ("[T]he proposed comprehen-
sive legislative package to govern wills, intestate succession, and related matters would 'provide rules that
are more likely to carry out the intent of the testator or, if a person dies without a will, the intent a decedent
without a will is most likely to have had'). This is not meant to suggest that a decedent's intent is unan-
imously embraced as the primary goal of intestate succession, see, Mary L. Fellows, Concealing Legisla-
tive Reform in the Common-Law Tradition: The Advancements Doctrine and the Uniform Probate Code,
37 VAND. L. REV. 671, 674 n.8 (1984); E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate
Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REv. 255, 289 (2002).
320 In re Lyon's Will, 2 N.E.2d 628, 630 (N.Y. 1936) ("The Legislature may by statute create a
general rule for the distribution of the property of a decedent in case of intestacy. The general rule so
formulated cannot take into account the desires or intentions of a particular decedent. Such desires or
intentions are ineffective unless expressed in a will properly executed and which conforms to the limita-
tions placed by law upon the testamentary power of the decedent. The courts give effect to a testamentary
intent so expressed; where there is no such expression of intent the decedent's property must be distributed
according to the general rule created by the Legislature.").
321 See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic
Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 36 (2009) (compiling data to compare to intestate distributions by
statute and identifying criticisms of intestate statutes).
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permit individuals to become account holders. Some terms of service agree-
ments spell out what happens to the contents of an account once the holder
dies. Yahoo!'s terms of service, at issue in the Ellsworth dispute, declare that
an account is "non-transferable and any rights to your .. . content within your
account terminates upon your death."32 2 While many, probably most, soon-
to-be account holders do not read the terms of service, any given decedent
may have, in fact, relied on the agreement o communicate intimate thoughts
in some messages that she would not have wanted to become known after
death. On the other hand, a decedent may have preferred to transfer all of the
account's contents to her survivors at death so that they could learn about her
life. Regardless, some terms of service agreements are silent about the treat-
ment of the account following the account holder's death. Under such cir-
cumstances, a decedent may have mistakenly assumed either that the privacy
of the password-protected account would survive death or that all of the ac-
count's contents would be transferred at death. With or without a provision
in the terms of service that governs post-mortem consequences following an
account holder's death, divining a decedent's intent boils down to making a
decision between two plausible choices with incomplete information as a
guide.
Recognizing the utility of empirical data as a tool to develop the Uni-
form Probate Code,3 23 NetChoice commissioned a study to discover what
people thought about post-mortem privacy of digital accounts.3 2 4 Zogby An-
alytics conducted an online survey of 1,012 adults during January 2015 that
consisted of six questions about the respondents' views of privacy of online
information after death.3 25 According to NetChoice's interpretation of the sur-
vey's results,
More than 70 percent of Americans think that their private online communications
and photos should remain private after they die-unless they gave prior consent for
others to access. In addition, 70 percent also felt that the law should err on the side
of privacy when someone dies without documenting their preference about how to
handle their private communications and photos.
326
Given the results of the survey, NetChoice concluded, "Americans say that
their right to privacy does not end when they take their last breath, and be-
lieve that maintaining the privacy of their electronic communications trumps
giving access to family and heirs. "327
322 See Yahoo Terms ofService, supra note 105.
323 Martin L. Fried, The Uniform Probate Code: Intestate Succession and Related Matters, 55 ALB.
L. REv. 927, 929-31 (1992) (describing the ULC's use of empirical data during the drafting of the Uni-
form Probate Code).







Although the numerical results eemingly support NetChoice's position
on post-mortem privacy, the survey's results may not be as unambiguous as
NetChoice's conclusion indicates. Ignoring any argument that NetChoice
paid for results that happened to match its legislative position,3 28 the questions
and possible answers associated with the survey's two primary conclusions
suggest more modest conclusions than NetChoice drew from the data. The
first question relied upon for NetChoice's two chief conclusions asked
"[a]fter a person dies which of the following describes your view when it
comes to keeping the emails and instant messages along with digital photos
they have sent private?"3 29 The available responses to the question included
(with percentage of respondents in agreement):
1. My online communications and photos should remain private. I
wouldn't want anyone accessing them after I die, unless I gave
prior consent. (70.5% agreed)
2. Estate attorneys and executors hould control my private communi-
cations and photos even if I didn't give prior consent. (15.2%
agreed)
3. Not sure (14.4 % agreed)330
Thus, NetChoice decided that 70% of respondents favored post-mortem pri-
vacy in the absence of express permission to access the contents of digital
accounts after an account holder's death.
The problem with the general conclusion that 70% of respondents prefer
privacy over access in general terms is that it exceeds the framework of the
question. The question asked about post-mortem privacy associated with in-
formation "they have sent," but did not capture a respondent's view of post-
mortem privacy of incoming messages.3 ' A possibility exists that an individ-
ual may have differing views of privacy associated with outgoing and incom-
ing mail. On one hand, the expansive storage capability and password pro-
tection of email and instant message accounts may have expanded the expec-
tation of privacy to include both outgoing and incoming information. If so,
the omission of respondents' views of post-mortem privacy of incoming mes-
sages could be inconsequential. On the other hand, a sender may place a
greater value on the privacy of outgoing messages because they contain the
sender's thoughts whereas incoming messages contain a correspondent's
thoughts.3 32 As a result, an individual may desire post-mortem privacy for
328 Compare id (stating that the poll was "conducted by Zogby Analytics for NetChoice"), with
PEAC, supra note 54.
329 Privacy Afterlife, supra note 251.
330 Id.
331 id
332 This is not intended to suggest that nothing can be gleaned from incoming messages. To the
contrary, access to incoming information may provide a great deal of information about the message that
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outgoing information while simultaneously having less concern about post-
mortem access to incoming information. In fact, the dichotomy exists in the
real world, as outgoing and delivered mail is private because it cannot be
retrieved, but incoming and received mail can be privately retained during
life with the intent that it be discovered at death.333 The probability that re-
spondents differentiate privacy by distinguishing between outgoing and in-
coming messages might be low, but it also might not be zero. In any event,
adding the words 'or received' to the survey question would account for the
possibility and more accurately gauge what respondents thought about post-
mortem privacy.
Similarly, the other question associated with NetChoice's primary con-
clusions does not precisely match the conclusion drawn by NetChoice. The
survey question stated "[s]ince 1986, a federal law has prioritized privacy of
electronic communications such as email. But now trusts and estates attor-
neys want new laws giving them control over private communications when
a person dies. In your opinion, what should be the priority?" 33 4 The three
available responses to the question included (with percentage of respondents
in agreement):
1. Privacy should be the priority. We may not know whether a deceased
person wanted family or friends to see their private communications and
photos. (70.2% agreed)
2. Access should be the priority. It doesn't matter whether or not the de-
ceased person wanted family or friends to see their private communica-
tions and photos - all of it should be available for family and heirs to
see. (14.4% agreed)
3. Not sure. (15.5% agreed).33
From this data, NetChoice maintained that 70% of those surveyed believed
that the law should protect privacy after death in the absence of any indica-
tion from the decedent about how death affected the management of the con-
tents of online accounts.
Although the results again seemingly support NetChoice's conclusion
that posthumous privacy is preferred, the language used in both the question
and the responses leave doubt about the firmness of the conclusion. The ques-
tion declares that "trusts and estates attorneys" want "new laws giving them
control" over a decedent's digital accounts.3 36 Using the phrase "giving them
was sent to the correspondent. Nevertheless, certainty about he information sent is beyond reach in the
absence of the outgoing message.
333 Bruce Feiler, Secret Histories, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014), http://nyti.ms/IjaNYMW (containing
several stories about secrets that were preserved during life but intended to be revealed at death. According
to the story, "some things are too painful to discuss while people are living but too important to be left
unsaid after they die").





(attorneys) control" makes it sound as if attorneys will use the information
stored in the account for whatever purpose is desired. Attorneys, of course,
do not control a decedent's property for their own purposes and few persons
would likely want an attorney, who may be a stranger, to have "control over
private communications when a person dies."3 3 7 As a result, the possibility
exists that respondents chose their answers based upon fear that an attorney
or stranger would control information after death rather than an undiluted
general desire to prohibit all access to digital contents after death. Given the
phrasing of the questions and answers, privacy may be preferred in a quali-
tative sense, but the quantitative strength of that preference is questionable.
And the quantitative differential matters-the conclusion would not be
nearly as strong if privacy was preferred by a plurality of the study's respond-
ents.
Whatever the value of Zogby's research study, and some data is better
than no data, the mechanics of probate provide a basic reason to establish a
default rule of nondisclosure for persons who die intestate without surveys
or statistics. In many cases, an intestate individual's personal representative
will be a person close to the decedent, such as a spouse, parent, or an adult
child. Indeed, such individuals are identified as eligible personal representa-
tives by statute if an individual dies intestate.3 3 8 A strong possibility exists,
then, that private communications stored in a decedent's online account con-
tain private information about the very person who will be given access to
the account following the death of the account holder. Some messages will
be off-hand, even snarky, remarks about a personal representative that may
not be particularly informative or hurtful. But other messages may contain
more intimate information about the personal representative that a decedent
never intended to reveal to individuals other than the recipient of the mes-
sage.33 9 Under those circumstances, the fiduciary duties governing the actions
of a personal representative's fiduciary duties do not provide a remedy be-
cause disclosure occurred while the personal representative fulfilled her du-
ties. In such cases, which would likely be a majority of probate proceedings
given the number of intestate estates, access equals distribution and a risk of
subsequent harm.
Ultimately, a personal representative need not "broadcast the infor-
mation to the world" to breach a decedent's interest in privacy.34 0 Information
that the decedent did not want known by anyone other than a correspondent
337 Id.
338 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 395.040 (2016) (identifying a spouse and then others entitled
to a share of the estate as eligible for appointment as a personal representative); NEV. REV. STAT. §
139.040 (2015) (listing the order of priority as surviving spouse, children, father or mother, brother or
sister, grandchildren, anyone else entitled to take by intestacy); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.28.120 (2016)
(specifying the order of priority as surviving spouses, children, father or mother, brothers or sisters, grand-
children, nephews and niece, and then others who are not related to the decedent by blood).
339 See, e.g., supra notes 307-313 and accompanying text (discussing the emotional and mental harm
that can result from disclosing intimate communications).
340 See Blachly, supra note 246, at 19.
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might be disclosed unless a decedent's intent for posthumous privacy is rec-
ognized and protected in addition to the protections afforded surviving cor-
respondents. One's imagination need not stretch all that far to think that pri-
vate thoughts about a personal representative, who is likely to be a family
member, in an online account may be hurtful if discovered by the personal
representative. Furthermore, providing access by default risks wider distri-
bution because of the possibility that the party learning the contents inten-
tionally or unintentionally disseminates the information. As a result, the only
way to avoid the potential for harm to an intestate decedent's interest in post-
humous privacy is to set the default on the nondisclosure end of the privacy
spectrum.
B. Testamentary Intent, RUFADAA, and PEA C
Unlike intestate law's distribution according to a decedent's probable
intent, the probate of a valid will allocates property pursuant to a decedent's
intent as expressed by the four corners of the instrument. The law from every
corner of the nation describes a testator's intent as the bedrock of interpreting
wills. For example, Maine's code succinctly provides that "[t]he intention of
a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his disposi-
tions."341 Similarly, published opinions proclaim hallowed reverence for tes-
tator intent in the interpretation of wills by extolling the search for a testator's
intent as the "cardinal rule" or the "cardinal principle" of will interpreta-
tion.342 The Supreme Court of North Carolina announced that "[t]he intent of
the testator is the polar star that must guide the courts in the interpretation of
a will." 343 Presumably conveying the same idea, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania referred to the intent of a testator as a "polestar" that must "prevail"
when interpreting a will.344 Whether a "cardinal rule," a "cardinal principle,"
or some permutation of a phrase describing a luminous body in the sky, the
341 Me. Stat. tit. 18, §2-603 (2015). See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §11.12.230 (West 2015)
(commanding "due regard" for testator's "true intent"); Mo. ANN. STAT. §474.430 (West 2016) (identical
to Washington's provision); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-09-03 (West 2015) ("The intention of a
testator as expressed in the testator's will controls the legal effect of the testator's dispositions"); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-2341 (West 2016) (identical to North Dakota's provision); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.227
(West 2016) (identical to North Dakota's provision).
342 In re Estate of Bair, 341 N.W.2d 188, 189 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (using the phrase "cardinal
rule"); In re Williams' Estate, 242 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Neb. 1976) (discussing the "cardinal principle" of
will interpretation).
343 Adcock v. Perry, 290 S.E.2d 608, 611 (N.C. 1982) (quoting Wing v. WachoviaBank & Trust Co.,
272 S.E.2d 90 (N.C. 1980)).
344 In re Schappell's Estate, 227 A.2d 651, 652 (Pa. 1967) (quoting In re Houston Estate, 201 A.2d
592, 595 (Pa. 1964)).
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bottom line is that the intent of a testator controls the distribution of the tes-
tator's estate.345
NetChoice now lauds RUFADAA because it "[h]onors citizens' explicit
... choices regarding their privacy afterlife," 346 but 'if requested' court orders
erode RUFADAA's commitment to testator intent. Even if a decedent left a
validly executed will that unambiguously directs disclosure of account con-
tents, an online service provider possesses the authority to require a court
order before complying with the testator's intent under RUFADAA. Seeking
a court order to establish that "the user consented to disclosure of the content"
or that "disclosure of the content . .. is reasonably necessary for administra-
tion of the estate" is redundant when a decedent has a validly executed will
with a valid disclosure provision.34 7 The disclosure provision in a decedent's
will represents a decedent's consent. Furthermore, disclosure is not "reason-
ably necessary" for estate administration when a will contains a valid disclo-
sure provision, but is instead simply "necessary" to administer a testator's
estate pursuant to a testator's intent.348 The same is true under PEAC, in that
a court order to establish that a "request is not in conflict with the deceased
user's will" or that the decedent "expressly consented to the disclosure" is
unnecessary if a decedent's validly executed will directs disclosure.349 Given
that many state statutes command personal representatives to settle dece-
dents' estates "expeditiously," if requested and mandatory court orders are
unnecessary roadblocks to honoring a testator's intent regarding disclosure
in the absence of a reason to doubt that intent.3 50
Although court orders are only required if requested under RUFADAA,
the fiscally responsible and legally prudent strategy for online service pro-
viders fielding requests for either a record or contents under RUFADAA is
345 For other expressions of adherence to testator's intent, see First Nat. Bank of Ga. v. Jenkins, 345
S.E.2d 829, 830 (Ga. 1986) ("The court will look to the intent of the testator when construing the language
of a will and, whenever possible, the intent of the testator will govern the outcome"); Conover v. Cade,
112 N.E. 7, 10 (Ind. 1916) ([I]n the construction of a will all its provisions must be considered, and the
intent of testator, if manifested, must be given effect. . . ."); In re Granberry's Estate, 310 So. 2d 708, 711
(Miss. 1975) ("[T]he fundamental rule governing the construction of all wills is to ascertain the intent of
the testator"); Waldman v. Hoechst, 487 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Mo. 1972) ("We must determine the intent of
the testator from the language of the will if possible ....
346 NetChoice Two-Pager, supra note 62.
347 RUFADAA, supra note 58, § 7(5)(c).
348 The right to transfer property at death is not without limitations. See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmts. a, c (2003) (describing
the general freedom to transfer property at death and limits such as "impermissible racial or other categoric
restrictions").
349 PEAC, supra note 54, § 1
350 See e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-2-834 (2016) (personal representative should proceed "expedi-
tiously"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3703 (2016) (personal representative to act "expeditiously and
efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate"); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-7-1 (West 2016)
(personal representative has "a general duty to settle the estate as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice
of value as is reasonable under all of the circumstances").
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to require personal representatives to obtain court orders as a matter of
course. Demanding a court order from a personal representative is, more or
less, a cost-free way to protect against liability. Indeed, the experiences of
Marsha Mehran's father, Justin Ellsworth's father, and Karen Williams sug-
gest that disclosure is not likely to occur without court involvement-each
of those examples involved negotiation and court time. Furthermore, a court
order pursuant to RUFADAA's requirements, like PEAC's requirements,
must include a judicial finding that disclosure does not create liability under
federal law."' As a result, online service providers are likely to request court
orders under RUFADAA because making the demand not only costs them
nothing, but also shields them from liability. In short, RUFDAA's require-
ment that a court order is only necessary 'if requested' will likely transform
into a de facto requirement when applied in the real world.
The mandatory court order under PEAC and its analog under
RUFADAA are not only cost-free protective mechanisms, but also have the
potential to reduce the cumulative financial burden of compliance for online
service providers. Whatever it may cost a service provider to acquire and
deliver information about an account to a personal representative, the cost is
greater than zero. The costs of acquisition and delivery in isolation may not
amount to much in the digital age, but presumably an employee of the service
provider will have to be involved in the process at some point. And while the
costs may be small in an individual case, the financial and opportunity costs
could be quite large in the aggregate given the number of online account
holders who may seek access and delivery. If the online service provider re-
quires a court order prior to disclosure, however, some access seekers are
likely to be dissuaded from the pursuit of a court order that details the specific
findings required under either RUFADAA or PEAC. The number of access
seekers that opt to forego the court order following a request by an online
service provider represents a cost-savings in the aggregate. Much like the
legal protection offered by requesting a court order, the potential cost-savings
again cause the permissive approach to court orders under RUFADAA to
mutate into the mandatory requirement under PEAC.
The mandatory requirement under PEAC and the possible or probable
requirement under RUFADAA not only save costs for online service provid-
ers, but also add costs to the administration of a testator's estate. As a general
matter, an attorney is not required to probate an estate. Probating an estate
without the aid of legal counsel, however, can be difficult because of the
multiple tasks to be accomplished by a personal representative during estate
administration. A personal representative must collect the decedent's assets,




an inventory, and distribute a decedent's property.3 52 Some tasks are straight-
forward, but others are less than obvious for non-lawyers. For example, state
statutes often dictate the order in which a decedent's debts are to be paid.35 3
While running afoul of an order of payment statute really only causes prob-
lems if the estate cannot retire all of the decedent's debts, most non-estate
lawyers, in all likelihood, would not consider the possibility of estate insol-
vency at the outset of the probate process. Despite its challenges,35 4 the in-
trepid individual is nevertheless perfectly free to tackle the administration of
a decedent's estate without the assistance of an attorney.
The factual and legal findings that must be included in court orders un-
der PEAC and RUFADAA, however, all but dictate that a lawyer will be
involved in the administration of an account holder's estate. PEAC requires
a court to find that "disclosure of the contents is not a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701 et. seq., 47 U.S.C. § 222, or other applicable law."35 5 Similarly,
RUFADAA's possible or probable court orders include a finding that "dis-
closure of the user's digital assets is reasonably necessary for administration
of the estate."3 5 6 Phrases like PEAC's "other applicable law" or RUFADAA's
"reasonably necessary" as well as Byzantine references to the United States
Code instruct the non-lawyer personal representative to employ an attorney
to discover "other applicable law" that might impact disclosure.3 " The down
side of court hearings and attorneys, of course, is that they cost money and
the estate pays those costs.3" Paying those costs means that there is less prop-
erty to be distributed to takers under the will. Although many individuals
voluntarily seek legal assistance during estate administration as a routine
matter, requiring court orders to disclose digital assets when there is a valid
352 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-703 (2016); IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1 (2016); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 395.001 (West current through the end of the 2016 regular session); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 62-
3-703 (2009 & Supp. 2015); WIs. STAT. § 857.03 (2016).
353 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-50-106 (West 2016) (payment priority); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
733.707 (West 2016) (order of payment); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147.195 (West 2015) (priority of
payment of debts and charges of estate).
354 Indeed, numerous advice-oriented columns detail the difficulties associated with performing the
functions of a personal representative during estate administration. See e.g., Pat Curry, Estate Executor:
No Job for Amateurs, BANKRATE.COM (Nov. 11, 2002), http://web.archive.org/web/20120308100607/
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/advice/2002111 a.asp; Pamela Yip, Think Long, Hard Before Be-
coming Someone's Estate Executor, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (May 17, 2013), http://www.dallas
news.com/business/personal-finance/headlines/20130517-think-long-and-hard-before-becoming-
someones-executor.ece.
355 PEAC, supra note 54, § 1(B)(c)(vii).
356 RUFADAA, supra note 58, § 8(4)(D)(ii).
357 PEAC, supra note 54, § 1(B)(c)(vii) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et. seq. (2012), 47 U.S.C. § 222
(2012)); RUFADAA, supra note 58, § 8(4)(D)(ii).
358 See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§ 28-48-109 (West 2016) (governing repayment of necessary ex-
penses); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2481 (West 2016) (estate litigation expenses); UTAH CODE ANN.§
75-3-719 (West 2016) (estate litigation expenses).
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will that addresses the matter unnecessarily adds to the time and expense of
probate to the detriment of the decedent's estate and intent.
Court ordered disclosure that involves lawyers burden all estates that
seek access and isclosure, but will be especially onerous for estates that
qualify for summary probate. Most states have summary administration pro-
cedures for so-called "small estates" that hold property that is valued at less
than a designated dollar amount.359 Although summary procedures vary re-
garding court and attorney involvement,360 the basic benefit of summary ad-
ministration is that it streamlines the probate process by permitting qualifying
estates to avoid full, formal probate procedures."' In other words, summary
procedures reduce probate costs and consume less time.362 The ubiquity of
digital assets and the evidentiary findings required to obtain a court orders
under PEAC or RUFADAA, however, all but guarantee that an attorney will
be involved in almost all estate proceedings, including those eligible for sum-
mary administration. A small estate in Rhode Island, which is defined to be
an estate with property valued at $15,000 or less, could be required to obtain
a court order for a catalogue or the contents of a digital account.6 Given the
complexity of the evidentiary findings for non-lawyers, a personal repre-
sentative is likely to retain counsel during administration and the associated
costs will be paid from the $15,000 estate. Thus, the mandatory or de facto
court orders under PEAC and RUFADAA undercut the procedural benefit of
summary administration; requiring court orders drains a small estate of its
limited assets, which is contrary to a decedent's intent.364
The cost shifting of each model proposal, as well as the legal safe harbor
offered therein, suggests a more fundamental critique-the model statutes
are aimed at protecting the interests of online service providers at the expense
of a testator's intent. If a testator has included a specific provision for access
to her digital accounts in a validly executed will,6 5 the testator has presuma-
bly considered the consequences of divulging the contents of digital accounts
359 See e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 13100 (West 2016) (defining small estates as those less than
$150,000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 241 (2016) (designating small estates as those less than $150,000).
360 Joseph N. Blumberg, 51 Flavors: A Survey of Small Estate Procedures Across the Country, 28
PROB. & PROP., 31, 32 (JULY-AUG. 2014) (distinguishing between the small estate process that requires
court involvement and that which does not require any court oversight).
361 id
362 Id. at 33 ("A full probate proceeding typically lasts at least six months, and often years. Summary
Administration, particularly in a state that requires publication, commonly lasts at least six months. Sum-
mary Administration reduces the courts' dockets compared to full probate proceedings, but only the Af-
fidavit Procedure takes those cases out of the court system altogether."); see also id. (noting that some
state statutes require an attorney).
363 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-24-1 (2016).
364 The word "small" as it applies to "small estates" is relative. One might argue that Oklahoma's
designation of estates that contain property valued at $150,000 or less does not qualify as a "small" estate.
365 The phrase "specific provision" is used to avoid an issue regarding access based upon broad
language in a will's residuary clause.
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and chosen to make the contents available for distribution. Under those cir-
cumstances, a testator's explicit expression of consent to access to and dis-
closure of the contents of digital accounts in a will represents the testator's
deliberate waiver of the protection offered by the recognition of posthumous
privacy. In fact, the inclusion of a will provision waiving posthumous privacy
cannot be anything but he result of due deliberation-the issue is too novel
and too sparsely included in existing wills for any waiver provision to be
considered boilerplate and therefore not the product of considered decision-
making for the ordinary testator. A testator's specific intent to permit access
and disclosure should not be re-examined by a court for the purpose of ob-
taining a court order to command what he testator has already commanded
by an explicit provision in a will.
If the drafters of RUFADAA and PEAC actually sought to respect an
account holder's posthumous privacy designations, the language of each
model statute should mandate disclosure if a testator intends to disclose the
contents of an account. To obtain access and disclosure, a personal repre-
sentative could be required to produce a death certificate, appropriate account
identification, letters testamentary or a small estate affidavit, and the will
with an explicit direction regarding disclosure."' Granting disclosure of de-
sired information following reception of those instruments would bring post-
mortem access in line with other assets held by third parties after the death
of an account holder. Banks, for example, may release funds in a decedent's
bank accounts after eceiving a death certificate, information that identifies
the account, and letters testamentary or a small estate affidavit in the appro-
priate case.367 Similarly, state statutes provide personal representatives with
access to a decedent's safe deposit box without a court order."' Providing
access and disclosure without court involvement for an account holder who
leaves a validly executed will puts the account holder in full control of ac-
count contents after death and reflects a firm commitment to honoring the
intent of a deceased account holder.
Reducing the potential for court involvement in the decision to access
and disclose information stored in digital assets does not mean that there is
no role for a court to play under all circumstances. To the contrary, a court
order could be requested in good faith to establish the validity of the authority
of the personal representative if a will is unclear, to interpret ambiguous lan-
guage appearing to grant access to digital accounts, or to clarify the identity
of the account or the account holder. In those instances, online service pro-
viders must have a way to determine the legal veracity of the request for an
366 A correspondent with information remaining in a decedent's account could retain the right to
object to the disclosure of information in which correspondent had an interest.
367 See, e.g., How to Notify Bank of America When a Customer Passes Away, BANK OF AM.,
https://www.bankofamerica.com/help/help-when-a-customer-passes-away.go (last visited Aug. 31,
2016).
368 See e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.5 (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28A-15-13 (2016); TEX.
EST. CODE ANN. § 151.003 (West 2015).
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account record or contents. Indeed, transferring account information in the
absence of a court order amidst legal uncertainty would be injudicious be-
cause of the risk of liability under state or federal law for wrongful disclosure.
Moreover, providing a mechanism to ensure the legality of a request as a
safety measure does not contravene a decedent's intent for access to and dis-
closure of account contents. Where resort to court is necessary, a question
exists about whether the decedent's intent is being fulfilled or what the dece-
dent intended by the language in the will; court involvement in such cases
protects a decedent's intent to the extent it can be deciphered.
In some cases, honoring a testator's intent as expressed on the face of
the will could have a deleterious effect on administration. A testator, for ex-
ample, could instruct that no one is to access an email account after death for
any reason and that intent should generally be honored. But if a personal rep-
resentative cannot account for all of the decedent's assets or debts, a possi-
bility exists that evidence of either could be stored in the email account. Un-
der those circumstances, the testator's intent to bar posthumous access to the
digital information frustrates the process of administering the estate. In eco-
nomic terms, the intent to bar access creates externalities that burden personal
representatives and the takers under the will who may have to wait for distri-
bution of estate property. Instances where a personal representative finds her-
self facing uncertainty about the existence of assets or debts might be rare,
but they are not inconceivable. Indeed, the impetus for Connecticut's first
generation statute involved a surviving spouse who needed to access a dece-
dent spouse's email account for business purposes.3 69 In cases where infor-
mation cannot be obtained without access, the costs of posthumous privacy
exceed its benefits; a testator's intent cannot be satisfied regardless of its con-
sequences.
Rather than complete immunity from access and disclosure based upon
testator's will, model statutes like RUFADAA and PEAC should account for
the possibility that a testator's intent for posthumous privacy may need to be
breached to promote the orderly administration of estates. In fact, two of the
present provisions in each of the statutes could form the foundation for ob-
taining a record of communications or disclosure of contents if needed during
estate settlement despite a testator's expressed intent for nondisclosure.
RUFADAA §7(5)(C)(iv) requires a court to find that disclosure is "reasona-
bly necessary for administration of the estate."37 0 Similarly, PEAC requires a
court to find that a request for access is "narrowly tailored to effect the pur-
pose of administration of the estate."3 7 1 To satisfy either standard, a personal
representative could identify the information needed, explain its necessity,
and describe the failed steps taken to procure the information without access
to account information. All of the evidence necessary to satisfy each of those
elements should be readily available to the personal representative without
369 See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
370 RUFADAA, supra note 58, § 7(5)(C)(iv).
371 PEAC, supra note 54, § 1(A)(f).
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the cost of discovery. A testator's intent for posthumous privacy should be
respected, but a testator's intended privacy cannot be an insurmountable bar-
rier that stymies estate administration.
CONCLUSION
Within the past year, a flurry of legislative activity has orbited what was
a straightforward issue not long ago in the non-digital world - access to and
disclosure of property in a decedent's estate. For some, the issue of post-
mortem access is cut and dry because information stored in digital assets is a
decedent's property just like postal mail, handwritten notes, or any other tan-
gible property in a decedent's home. Information stored in digital assets may
be deemed "property" of a decedent, but it is different from property in the
tangible world. Digital information can remain available for a long time after
the death of the account holder; one's online information may create a sort
of immortality for the account holder. Furthermore, the sheer volume and
storage capability in the modem digital age has no analog in the past. To that
end, Chief Justice Roberts observed in Riley v. California3 7 2 that a cell phone
may store "a broad array of private information never found in a home in any
form.""' Justice Alito echoed a similar refrain by noting that a cell phone is
"capable of storing and accessing a quantity of information, some highly per-
sonal, that no person ever would have had on his person or in hard-copy
form."3 7 4 Indeed, the problems associated with post-mortem access to digital
assets during estate administration would not have captured widespread leg-
islative interest if digital property was the exact equivalent of tangible prop-
erty-the issue would have been readily addressed by settled law.
The quantity, capability, and durability of digital information not only
pressures the law of wills, but also challenges the traditional view that indi-
vidual privacy ends at death. But unlike the staid law of wills, the law of
privacy has not been a static concept from an historical perspective. To that
end, the influential article, The Right of Privacy by Warren and Brandeis,
maintained that "recent inventions" justified the development of a principle
that protected one's right "to be let alone" and stitched existing legal doc-
trines together to create a concept denominated as a "right of privacy."3 7 5 In-
deed, statutory exceptions to the termination of an individual's interest in
372 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)
373 Id.
374 Id. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring). For more on the differences between digital and physical assets,
see e.g., Lange, supra note 252 ("[D]igital assets differ significantly from physical estates. . . .").
375 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890) ("Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for
the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let
alone."') (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (1880))); id at 197 ("It is our purpose to
consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy
of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such protection is.").
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privacy at death illustrate privacy's modem malleability. Within the context
of post-mortem access to digital assets, the inability to protect posthumous
privacy by employing the protective approaches of statutory exceptions like
HIPPA and FOIA warrants the inclusion of posthumous privacy among the
factors to be considered when crafting a legislative response. Once included
in the legislative balance, the weight of a decedent's interest in privacy tips
the privacy scale toward non-disclosure for individuals who die intestate and
toward disclosure if a testator has instructed that account contents be availa-
ble in a will. Doing so most closely conforms to the fundamental law of
wills-honoring a decedent's intent.
